In re Eddie S.
Filed 3/5/07 In re Eddie S. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re EDDIE S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE S., Defendant and Appellant. | E040312 (Super.Ct.No. RIJ106587) OPINION |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Robert J. McIntyre, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan K. Keiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Teresa Torreblanca and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The Riverside County District Attorney filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1]petition alleging that defendant and appellant Eddie S. (minor) committed a robbery. (Pen. Code, 211.) A juvenile court found true the allegation and placed minor on probation. On appeal, minor contends that the juvenile court used an improper legal standard (its own personal experience) when assessing the reliability of the victims cross-racial identification,[2]and that there was insufficient evidence to support the courts true finding. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of May 13, 2005, the victim was riding his bike at Hunt Park when minor approached him. The victim recognized minor because they attended the same middle school, and he had seen minor five or six times at school. Minor asked the victim if he knew Chris Diaz. Minor also asked the victim what kind of bike he had. Minor then talked to some of his friends and walked away. About 10 to 15 minutes later, minor approached the victim again. Minor had the same clothes on, but was wearing a black ski mask that covered his entire face, except his eyes and mouth. Minor told the victim to come here. Then minor grabbed the handlebars on the victims bike and said, [L]et me have your bike. When the victim refused, minor said, Im gonna hit you. Minor then took the victims bike away from him against his will.
The victim testified that he knew that the person who took his bike was the same person that he initially talked to about the bike because he had the same clothes, the same size and structure, and the same voice. Because the victim did not know minors name, he went home and looked him up in the school yearbook. The victim found minors photograph right away.
Minor denied being at Hunt Park on May 13, 2005, and taking the victims bike, but acknowledged that he knew Chris Diaz from his science class.
ANALYSIS
I. The Juvenile Court Properly Made Its True Finding
Minor contends that the court erroneously relied on its personal experience, rather than on the evidence, when assessing the victims cross-racial identification of minor. Minors claim is meritless.
In support of his claim, minor quotes a portion of the courts ruling where the court stated: I was raised in a diverse community and everybody has their own features. So Im not buying that that would be a point of misidentification. When read in context, the courts comment was proper. Following the victims testimony, defense counsel made a motion under section 701.1 to dismiss the petition for insufficiency of the evidence. Defense counsel essentially argued that the victim identified minor simply because he was Black, but that there was nothing to distinguish minor from any other Black person. The court denied the motion. The courts comment at issue appeared to be simply a response to defense counsels argument that the victim could not have correctly identified minor.
Furthermore, contrary to minors claim, the court relied on the evidence presented at the hearing, not just on its personal experience, in reaching its true finding. The court stated that it believed the victims testimony that minor was the robber was true and accurate because: 1) minor was wearing the same clothes when he took the victims bike and when he talked to the victim a few minutes prior to the robbery; 2) when minor first approached the victim, minor asked him about his bike; 3) the victim recognized minors voice and build during the second encounter; and 4) the victim had seen minor before.
Thus, as the record clearly reflects, the court carefully evaluated the evidence before making its decision. Moreover, the court acted appropriately in dismissing defense counsels argument that all Black males look alike and, therefore, the victim must have misidentified minor.
II. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Courts True Finding
Minor contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the courts true finding that he committed a robbery. He argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law because the victims testimony was inherently incredible. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a true finding on a section 602 petition, we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) Moreover, [i]n deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Courts Finding
Minor does not contest the proof on any of the elements of robbery. His sole argument is that the victims identification of minor was unreliable and incredible. At the outset, we note that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.] (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)
No inherent improbability appears in the identification testimony of the victim. The court, as the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, found the victim completely credible, and we accept that determination. (People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1447.) The victim testified that he recognized minor because he had seen minor five or six times at school. Minor approached the victim and asked him a few questions, showing an interest in the victims bike. Within 10 to 15 minutes after that conversation, minor approached the victim again, wearing the same clothes. Although he had a ski mask on, the victim recognized minor because of his voice, size and structure, and clothing. The court believed the victims testimony and simply did not believe minors self-serving denials.
Minor argues that eyewitness identifications are notoriously unreliable. However, the cases cited by minor discuss the identification of strangers. (E.g., United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 228 [87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149].) Minor was not a stranger to the victim.
Minor then asserts that the victims identification of minor was unreliable because he described minors clothes inconsistently, and he said there was nothing unusual about minors clothes. The victim told the police that minor was wearing a dark T‑shirt and dark pants. He later told the prosecutor that minor was wearing either a white or dark shirt and black pants. The victim could not recall exactly what minor was wearing on the day of the robbery; however, the significant part of the victims testimony was that minor was wearing the same clothes when he robbed the victim as when minor talked to him the first time that day.
Minor further avers that the victims testimony that he immediately went home after the robbery, found minors picture in the yearbook, and learned his name, was inherently incredible. He contends that the testimony was incredible simply because the victim did not tell the police minors name when he first reported the incident. Instead, he told the police two months later. The record does not reflect why the victim neglected to give the police minors name at first. Furthermore, even if the victims testimony that he found minors picture in his yearbook immediately after the robbery was not true, the victim still definitively identified minor as the robber.
Minor additionally argues that the victims testimony that he recognized the robbers voice as minors voice was inherently incredible because the victim had never heard minors voice before May 13, 2005, and because the victim agreed that there was nothing unusual about minors voice. Even though the victim had never heard minors voice before that day, the victim talked to minor 10 to 15 minutes prior to the robbery. The victim could have easily recognized and identified minors voice.
Finally, minor asserts that the victim saw the robbers eyes and lips, which were exposed through the ski mask, and he acknowledged that most [B]lack people had brown eyes and big lips. He argues that there was no evidence that the robbers eyes or mouth were unique. We note that the victim recognized minor because of his voice, size, and clothing. Thus, whether or not the robbers eyes or mouth were unique is irrelevant.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the courts true finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P.J.
RICHLI
J.
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[1] All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
