P. v. Fields

Filed 3/6/07 P. v. Fields CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Kelvin Dwayne Fields appeals a judgment following his no contest plea to possession of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code,  11377, subd. (a).) He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his hotel room. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 11:30 p.m., uniformed police officers Olson and Anguiano were standing near their police vehicle at the Monterey Hotel, a hotel known to the police for drug activity and prostitution. Fields was loitering in the parking area, momentarily "froze" when he saw the officers, and then walked in the direction of the officers. When Fields was a few feet away, Officer Olson asked Fields what he was doing and whether he was on probation or parole, and Fields stated that "I am not on probation anymore" and "you can check it out." The officers then asked for Fields' name and birth date.

The officers checked out Fields' status and discovered an arrest warrant. They arrested Fields who stated that he had "paperwork" from the court in his room showing that he had taken care of the warrant. When Officer Olson asked whether Fields wanted him to retrieve the document, Fields stated: "Go to my room, go check. It is in there somewhere." The officers went to Fields' room, and discovered a plastic bag containing what appeared to be methamphetamine inside an open pack of cigarettes on the dresser. After an officer read Fields his Miranda[1]rights, Fields stated that he had bought the methamphetamine two days earlier. The officers were unable to find any document pertaining to the arrest warrant.

At the preliminary hearing, Fields moved to suppress evidence of the drugs arguing that the police had no reason to stop and detain him. The trial court denied the motion. After the motion was renewed and denied again, Fields entered a plea of no contest.

DISCUSSION

Fields contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that the police found methamphetamine in his hotel room. He argues that his consent to the search of his hotel room was tainted by a prior unlawful detention and requires the exclusion of the evidence. We disagree.

In reviewing the ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's express and implied factual findings when supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1107, 1113.) Conversely, we exercise our independent judgment based on the totality of circumstances in determining whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Id., at pp. 1113-1114; People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362, 366.)

Interactions between police and individuals may be consensual encounters, detentions, or formal arrests. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) An encounter that involves no restraint of liberty is deemed consensual and may be conducted by the police without any suspicion that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. (Ibid.; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327-328.) Law enforcement officers may approach an individual in a public place, pose questions, and ask for identification as long as the officers do not induce cooperation by coercive means. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 200-201; Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434-435; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497.) A person is detained or "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if there is an "actual taking into custody, whether by the application of physical force or by submission to the assertion of authority" so that, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. (People v. Brendlin, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1115, citing California v. Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621, 628; see also, e.g., Drayton, at p. 201.)

Here, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the encounter between Fields and the police that resulted in discovery of the arrest warrant was consensual, and not a detention. And, because Fields undisputedly consented to all subsequent acts by the police officers leading to discovery of drugs in his hotel room, there was no unlawful search or seizure.

The officers were standing near their police vehicle in the vicinity of the hotel and asked Fields basic and preliminary questions. The conversation was non-accusatory, routine, and brief, and would not have caused a reasonable person to believe that his or her liberty was being restrained. Moreover, Fields responded voluntarily and cooperatively, and actually asked the police to confirm his probation status. The record shows no display of authority by police other than uniforms and questions. They did not touch Fields, draw weapons, or use language or tone of voice indicating that compliance was required. (See In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.)

Also, contrary to Fields' assertion, police are not required to ask a person if he will answer questions. "While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response." (I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216.)

In addition, the conduct of a records check by the police does not automatically convert a consensual encounter into a detention. (People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1287.) The records check is "a single circumstance that must be viewed in light of the other facts presented." (Ibid.) In this case, there is no evidence that the check was prolonged, or that police officers took any identification document from Fields or ordered him to do anything while waiting for the records check. And, Fields expressed no desire to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter. Fields simply provided his identification voluntarily, stated his probation status, and suggested that officers check it. There is no evidence to suggest that the encounter was unusually prolonged.

Because we conclude that there was no detention, we need not consider Fields' argument that the detention was not justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

COFFEE, J.

Otis D. Wright, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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[1]Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.