In re G.S.

Filed 3/12/07 In re G.S. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Ronald P. Kreber. Affirmed.

Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *

Introduction

The juvenile court declared G. S. (the Minor) a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after he admitted allegations that he violated Health and Safety Code sections 11360, subdivision (a) and 11357, subdivision (e); Vehicle Code sections 20001, subdivision (a) and 23103; and Penal Code section 242. The juvenile court committed the Minor to 33 days detention in a juvenile facility, with credit for 33 days of time served, and imposed restitution fines and various probation conditions.

The Minor challenges the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding on the ground it was based on evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful traffic stop. He asserts the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle during a search following the stop. We conclude the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supported the juvenile courts conclusion that the police officer who stopped the Minors vehicle had at least a reasonable suspicion the Minor had violated Vehicle Code section 22107. We therefore affirm.

Facts and Proceedings in the Juvenile Court

On May 9, 2006, the district attorney filed two juvenile wardship petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The first petition charged the Minor with hit and run with injury (Veh. Code,  20001, subd. (a)), reckless driving (id.,  23103, subd. (a)), and battery (Pen. Code,  242). The second petition charged the Minor with unlawfully transporting marijuana (Health & Saf. Code,  11360, subd. (a)), and possessing less than 28.5 grams of marijuana on school grounds by a minor (id.,  11357, subd. (e)).

The unlawful transporting of marijuana charge in the second petition was based on evidence recovered during a search of the Minors vehicle following a traffic stop on September 15, 2005. The Minor moved to suppress that evidence on the ground the traffic stop was unlawful.

The juvenile court held a suppression hearing on May 30 and 31, 2006. The only witness was Garden Grove Police Officer Douglas Pluard. He testified as follows.

On September 15, 2005, at about 12:20 a.m., Pluard stopped to get a cup of coffee at an ARCO gas station at the intersection of Katella Avenue and Gilbert Street. A clerk at the gas station told Pluard the driver of a Ford Bronco that was refueling might have been involved in a drug transaction with a person in another vehicle. The Minor was driving the Bronco.

Pluard returned to his patrol car and followed the Bronco as it left the gas station and traveled eastbound on Katella Avenue. The time was about 12:25 a.m., and traffic was light. Without signaling, the Bronco made a right turn onto a small street. Pluard, who was 50 feet or less behind the Bronco, activated the patrol cars overhead light and initiated a traffic stop. As a result of the traffic stop, Pluard searched the Bronco and found marijuana and related paraphernalia.

On May 31, 2006, after hearing argument of counsel, the juvenile court denied the Minors motion to suppress. The court concluded the traffic stop was lawful, stating it believes the officer to be credible that he is 50 feet or less at the time the Bronco was negotiating its turn.

On June 6, 2006, the Minor waived his right to trial and admitted the truth of all allegations in both petitions. On the same day, the juvenile court declared the Minor to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, committed the Minor to 33 days of detention in a juvenile facility (with 33 days credit for time served), ordered the Minor to complete 15 days on a court work program and pay restitution, and imposed various restrictions and conditions of probation. The Minor appealed.

Discussion

1. Burdens of Proof and Standard of Review

On a motion to suppress evidence, the moving party bears the initial burden of proving the search was undertaken without a warrant. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 127‑128, 136 (Williams).) In this case, the parties stipulated the search was warrantless. Once the moving party meets that burden, the prosecution has the burden of proving a warrantless search or seizure was justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 130, 136‑137; People v. Rios (1976) 16 Cal.3d 351, 355‑356.) The [prosecution] may discharge the foregoing burden[] by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106, fn. 4; see also Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 127, 130.)

As the finder of fact in a proceeding to suppress evidence (Pen. Code,  1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) Thus, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts ruling, resolve all conflicts in its favor, and defer to those express or implied findings supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969; People v. Woods,supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 673.) We independently review the juvenile courts application of the law to the facts. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 969.)

2. The Evidence at the Suppression Hearing Supported a Finding the Police Officer Had a Reasonable Suspicion the Minor Made an Unlawful Turn.

A police officer may legally stop a motorist to conduct a brief investigation if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. (People v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 200.) The reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation the person detained committed a traffic violation or was involved in criminal activity. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.) The officers subjective intent or ulterior motive in stopping a vehicle is irrelevant to the legality of the stop. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 812‑813.)

The Minor argues the evidence did not support a finding that Pluard had a reasonable suspicion he made a turn in violation of Vehicle Code section 22107. Vehicle Code section 22107 provides: No person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway until such movement can be made with reasonable safety and then only after the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement. (Italics added.) The italicized passage has been interpreted to mean [t]he failure to signal a lane change does not always violate the Vehicle Code. (People v. Cartwright (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1366, fn. 6.) Section 22107 requires a turn signal only when the movement of the turning vehicle may affect another vehicle, usually the vehicle to the rear of the vehicle intending to turn. (See Stephens v. Hatfield (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 140, 144 [[t]he signal . . . is more for the benefit of the vehicles to the rear of the vehicle intending to turn].)

The vehicle affected by the movement of the turning vehicle may be a police patrol car. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 930 (Miranda).) In Miranda, a police officer in a marked patrol car followed a car containing two persons known to the police from their previous drug-related arrests. (Id. at p. 921.) The officer stopped the car when it made a left turn without signaling. (Ibid.) The driver consented to a search of the car, during which the officer found PCP in the trunk. (Id. at p. 922.) The Court of Appeal, affirming the denial of the defendants motion to suppress, concluded the police officer was legally authorized to stop the car because the drivers failure to signal the left turn violated Vehicle Code section 22107. (Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.) The court rejected the defendants contention no moving violation occurred because there was no other traffic: Officer Becerra was behind [the driver], and the primary benefit of the signal requirement is for the vehicles to the rear of the signalling vehicle. (Ibid.)

Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supported the conclusion that Pluards patrol car was affected by the movement of the Minors turning vehicle. Pluard testified he was following the Minor from a distance of 50 feet or less. The juvenile court expressly found that Pluard was credible and that he was 50 feet or less behind the Minors vehicle when it made the right turn. A reasonable inference from Pluards testimony is that the patrol car was in the same lane as the Minors vehicle and directly behind it. Since Pluard testified he was following the Minor, a reasonable inference is that Pluard was at least keeping pace with the Minor, and therefore was traveling at a sufficiently high speed to be affected by the Minors failure to signal the right turn. In sum, Officer [Pluard] was behind [the Minor], and the primary benefit of the signal requirement is for the vehicles to the rear of the signalling vehicle. (Miranda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.)

Thus, Pluard had reasonable suspicion to believe the Minor committed a Vehicle Code violation before making the traffic stop. The juvenile court did not err by denying the Minors motion to suppress.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

SILLS, P. J.

MOORE, J.

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