In re Angelina C.

Filed 3/7/07 In re Angelina C. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Cynthia B. (mother) and David C. (father) (collectively parents) appeal from the juvenile courts orders terminating their parental rights to their daughters Angelina C. (case number JD16028) and Christina C. (case number JD16029) (collectively the girls) and freeing them for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.26, 395.)[1] Father also appeals from the courts further order denying his petition to modify a prior order of the court ( 388, subd. (a)). We shall affirm the orders.

BACKGROUND

I. Events Leading to the Section 366.26 Hearing

On April 6, 2005, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Childrens Services (the department) filed petitions pursuant to section 300, alleging that then three-year-old Angelina C. and two-year-old Christina C. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) [risk of serious physical harm], (b) [failure to protect], and (j) [abuse of sibling]. Amended petitions regarding the girls were filed on April 18, 2005.

Parents currently have eight children, and at the time of the amended petitions had seven.[2] The amended petitions stated that of mothers five other children, four had related petitions filed for them under case numbers JD16024-16027. The fifth, Gabriel C., was the subject of a petition in case number JD16015. After the amended petitions were filed, the sixth child, Monica C., was born and on the day after her birth was placed in protective custody and thereafter became the subject of a petition in case number JD16159.

The amended petitions alleged that on March 29, 2005, Gabriel C.s mother hit him and knocked him against a bedpost, rendering him immobile. He was rushed to the hospital and found to be suffering from multiple symptoms of injury, including subdural hematomas as a result of new and old injuries, ecchymotic (black-and-blue) areas on the right forehead also resulting from new and old injuries, hemorrhaging of the left retina, bruises, abrasions, and scabs. Neither parent offered a reasonable explanation for the injuries, and [m]edical experts have opined that the injuries are of a nonaccidental nature. Gabriel was born with a positive toxicology screen for methamphetamine, and Isaac M. and Christina C. were each born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine or methamphetamine. Because Isaac was born in 1997 and Gabriel in 2003, mothers drug abuse had occurred over a period of several years; she had an extensive history of substance abuse, as did father, who was on probation for drug offenses. In interviews conducted in April of 2005, two of the children revealed that mother physically abused them and Gabriel daily. One of the children implied that mother intended to continue this conduct.

On April 20, 2005, the court found that the department had made a prima facie showing that the children came within section 300, and ordered them detained outside their home.

The reports prepared for the jurisdiction and disposition hearing were prepared on April 25, 2005, and were filed on August 24, 2005. The reports repeated the substance of the allegations made in the petitions. Adding to, amplifying, and/or modifying the petitions allegations, one or both reports also stated as follows: Gabriel C.s injuries were life-threatening, serious enough that he had to be readmitted to the hospital two days after discharge because of vomiting and lethargy and five days later underwent brain surgery to remove fluid that had accumulated inside his skull, followed by six more days of hospitalization. Mother showed up late at the hospital on the scheduled day of Gabriels brain surgery. A physician, Patrick Clyne, M.D., had concluded there was a high probability that some of Gabriels injuries, including the head injury, were nonaccidental, but mother had continually denied that she caused Gabriels head injury (at one point she stated that Gabriel threw himself on the floor during a tantrum, hitting his head on a bedpost), and father denied any knowledge of how it occurred. Parents had shown no interest in learning how Gabriel C. had been injured. The children had a history of neglect. Father had six criminal convictions, half of them for drug offenses. Parents were unemployed. Parents admitted that it was difficult to control their seven children and could not ensure Gabriels safety. The children were aggressive with one another. Gabriels maternal grandmother called to report that she believed parents did not want Gabriel. Mother admitted that she had a history of using crank, and had been using drugs since age 12. Father was currently incarcerated at a jail facility in Milpitas. Richard M., the father of the M. children, was currently incarcerated in Montana and in four years had had contact with his children only once. A social worker stated in the jurisdiction report that she could not assess any family strengths. But the disposition report stated that parents were committed to each other and their children, there was strong support from the extended family, and the children were bonded to parents. The jurisdiction report noted that parents had been cooperative and were willing to be tested for drugs. The disposition report recommended continued out-of-home custody for the children and family reunification services for parents. It recommended a reunification case plan under which parents would, among other things, take a class in nonviolent parenting and receive counseling on childhood trauma and substance abuse, undergo random alcohol and drug testing, undergo a 12-step substance abuse program, and devise their own plan to avoid relapsing into substance abuse.

An addendum report prepared on June 13, 2005, and filed on August 24, 2005, relayed Dr. Clynes conclusion that Gabriel C. showed three temporally distinct episodes of bleeding on his brain surface and that while in the care of parents he would have experienced significant pain and undergone dramatic changes in behavior.

Early in August of 2005, mother was incarcerated, apparently after being criminally charged for abusing Gabriel C.

At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on August 25, 2005, the juvenile court found true the section 300 allegations as to both girls It adopted the departments recommendations, declared the children dependents of the court and kept them from the custody of the parents (father was by then out of jail), directed the department to provide family reunification services to parents, and ordered parents to comply with the reunification case plan the department had proposed, substituting a requirement that mother undergo a 52-week child abusers treatment class in lieu of the 16-week nonviolent parenting class.

An interim report prepared on October 11, 2005, and filed on October 14, 2005, stated that mother remained incarcerated but showed interest in her childrens well-being. Fathers compliance with his reunification case plan was deficient and he was having little interaction with his children during visits with them. Among other problems, father had missed all seven required drug tests since the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.

The department prepared a six-month review report on December 9, 2005, which was filed on January 20, 2006. The report recommended another six months of reunification services. Mother had not displayed any level of remorse, responsibility or ill feelings for Gabriel C.s injuries or the abuse of her other children; she maintains her position that she did nothing wrong. She remained in jail, and had complied with her reunification case plan to the limited extent possible in custody, as well as writing to her children. The report predicted, however, that she would spend one to four years in state prison and would be unavailable to receive custody of her children during that time. Father was not complying with his reunification case plan and appeared to have no motivation to do so. He would visit the children on Thursdays for two hours, but often would lie on a mat and watch a movie on television whether or not the children were present.

In its addendum report of January 4, 2006, filed January 20, 2006, the department recommended terminating reunification services for the girls ( 366.21, subd. (e), 3d par.; see  361.5, subd. (b)(6).) The report noted, as had the departments six-month report, that because of her expected lengthy incarceration mother could not have custody of her children, and that she continued to deny responsibility for harming any of them. Father had missed half of his December drug tests, and on December 12, 2005, one of the dates on which he complied, he tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. This followed an alleged positive test result for amphetamine on October 26, 2005.

The juvenile court adopted the departments recommendation to terminate reunification services on January 20, 2006, following a contested hearing. The court found that both mothers and fathers progress in alleviating or mitigating the causes requiring placement had been poor. In addition to ordering that reunification services be terminated, the court ordered that a hearing to terminate parental rights under section 366.26 be set, and that the fathers visits be set at twice per month.

On January 30, 2006, the department recommended terminating parental rights ( 366.26) and implementing an adoption plan.

On June 12, 2006, father filed a request under section 388, subdivision (a), to modify the juvenile courts order of January 20, 2006. Father sought family maintenance with both children or, in the alternative, resumption of reunification services and an increase in visits. He declared and provided a detailed account of facts alleging that he was now clean and sober and fully engaged in his court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, that he was ready to see a therapist when his social worker could obtain one for him, that recent visits with his children had gone well, that he had found a job, that parents had made significant progress . . . in resolving the problems that led to the childrens removal, and that he had recently been allowed unsupervised overnight visits with one of the M. children. The court ruled that father had sufficiently stated a change in circumstances or new evidence and that a change in its order might promote the childrens best interests. It set a hearing date.

The department opposed fathers section 388 request. In an addendum report dated June 28, 2006, and filed on August 7, 2006, the department asserted that father was not currently an adequate parent. He had little experience parenting, although now, after months of showing indifference toward his children, he was making efforts at it; he was maintaining a relationship with mother and intended to continue it; and both he and mother continued to deny having committed any child abuse, including inflicting life-threatening injuries on Gabriel C., and even denied that the children had experienced any abuse at all. A social workers report stated that the girls were much more well-adjusted in a prospective adoptive home in which the department had placed them, had bonded with their prospective adoptive parents, and were thriving now that they were no longer in parents chaotic household. Also, a prior addendum report dated June 12, 2006, and filed on August 7, 2006, stated that the girls found visits with father pleasant, but had a stronger connection with their prospective adoptive parents.

II. The Sections 366.26 and 388 Hearing

The contested hearing on the sections 388 and 366.26 matters took place on August 7, 8, and 9, 2006. The parties relied heavily on their prior written factual allegations and statements. Father and the court agreed to consolidate the hearing on the sections 388 and 366.26 matters, given that the childrens interests would be relevant under both statutes and the same witnesses would be called.

The hearing established, inter alia, these other facts:

Pursuant to the departments recommendation, Destiny M. was living with father, and the department hoped to place David C., Jr., Richard M., Jr., and Isaac M. with him as well. The M. children and David Jr. were older and were more connected to father even though the actual father of three of them was Richard M. The girls did not seem to look forward to fathers visits, though they enjoyed them, and they referred to their prospective adoptive parents residence as their home. Father had devised no plan for the girls care, unlike the plan he did have for Destiny, David Jr., Richard Jr., and Isaac. A social worker opined that he could not care for the M. children and David Jr. and also provide adequate care for the girls.

The girls paternal aunt testified that she was the girls caretaker before their removal from parents. She had known the girls since birth and had seen them daily before their removal. The girls had a good relationship with father and their siblings. Father had a more mature and organized approach to life than before; he was working and was eager to regain custody of the children. She could help him with parenting duties and tasks.

The girls paternal grandmother testified that the girls had a good, affectionate relationship with father and their siblings. She had been helping drive father around and could continue to do so. Father would play with the girls in the park during visits. On examination by the departments counsel, the grandmother testified that she was not sure which girl was the older, but thought it was Christina C. (Mother would testify the next day that Angelina C. was now five, and Christina four.)

Father testified that he opposed having his parental rights terminated. He was now . . . succeeding: I am into my kids a lot more than what I was before. I do my responsibilities. I hold a job now. I go to my meetings, attend my Pathways class . . . . Before I never could do that. I would always fail on my Pathways classes. In general, he was a reformed person, agreeing with counsel that he was clean and sober. He felt bonded with the girls, especially Angelina C., and Angelina was bonded with him, whereas Christina C. was more bonded with mother. The siblings liked one another and were well-bonded with one another. Thirteen-year-old Destiny M., of whom he had custody, was doing well, better than in foster care. He did not have much money.

On examination by the girls counsel, father testified, I always cared for my children before they were removed [and] even after they were removed. He reluctantly agreed that he would be willing to separate from mother if necessary to regain custody of the girls, but did not feel that his children needed protection from mother.

Mother described the girls three visits with her in jail as pleasant and fun for all of them. She was scared to see them because she feared they could suffer from having to leave; Angelina showed some initial reluctance to do so following the second visit. They would call her mommy. The girls were especially bonded with Destiny M. The teacher in mothers in-custody parenting class viewed mother as a role model for the other attendees. Mother felt bonded with the girls, and they were bonded with their siblings. Mothers counsel stated at closing argument that mother did not dispute and in fact believed that the girls were highly adoptable in light of their age (see  366.26, subd. (c)(1)).

The juvenile court first denied fathers section 388 motion, ruling that he had not met his burden of proof of showing that it would be in the girls best interest to modify the prior order.

The juvenile court then turned to the section 366.26 matter. It first found by the required standard of clear and convincing evidence (see id., subd. (c)(1)) that the girls were likely to be adopted (see ibid.). The girls were young, mentally and physically healthy, doing well, and already in a foster home that would like to adopt them. Noting that the burden then shifted to parents to show an exception, the court found in substance that they had not shown a compelling reason (ibid.) that an exception should be made.

Parents had presented evidence that the beneficial-relationship and sibling-relationship exceptions should apply to them. Regarding the beneficial relationship exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the juvenile court reasoned, in line with the discussion in In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229: The crux of the issue is whether maintaining the parent-child relationship outweighs the benefits of adoption. . . . [A]n adoption weighs very heavily in the equation. The benefits of adoption, of permanence and a long-term home, a forever home, those are considered paramount under the law. . . . [] . . . [T]he parents have not prevailed showing that the benefits of the [girls] maintaining their relationships with their parents outweigh[] the benefits of adoption . . . .

Regarding the sibling relationship exception ( 366.26 subd. (c)(1)(E)), the juvenile court followed this courts decision in In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395. Noting that Erik P. indicates that [the sibling relationship] exception is meant to preserve relationships for siblings who have basically been the anchors for each other throughout their lives and throughout the dependency, the juvenile court found that the girls were anchors for each other but were not similarly anchored to their other siblings. Accordingly, the court found that the sibling relationship exception did not apply.

On August 24, 2006, the juvenile court entered orders under section 366.26, terminating parents parental rights and freeing the girls for adoption, and another order denying fathers section 388 request.

DISCUSSION

On August 24, 2006, the day on which the juvenile court entered its final orders, mother filed notice of appeal from the courts judgment. Father filed his notice of appeal on September 7, 2006, appealing from the courts orders under sections 366.26 and 388. Both appeals are timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 37(d)(1); see now id., rule 8.400(d)(1).)

Parents first contend that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile courts order terminating their parental rights.

In a dependency case, [w]hen the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile courts finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports it. [Citations.] Under this standard of review we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. [Citation.] We must resolve all conflicts in support of the determination and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the courts order. Additionally, we may not substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact. [Citations.] [] However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citation.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.] Furthermore, [w]hile substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be a product of logic and reason and must rest on the evidence [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations]. [Citation.] The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record. [Citation.] [Citations.] (In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 216-217.)

At a hearing under section 366.26, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a minor is likely to be adopted, the court must terminate parental rights and order the minor placed for adoption unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental due to one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to adoption. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 291.) Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. [Citation.] If reunification efforts have failed and the child is adoptable, the court must select adoption unless it finds terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child under at least one of five statutory exceptions. (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

Plainly, substantial evidence supported the juvenile courts decision. Some of it was contradicted, but that is not the test. As long as the court reasonably (In re Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 217) rested its decision on solid and credible evidence (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172) constituting substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case (ibid.), we may not overturn its order.

We need not reiterate in detail the facts set forth above to explain that substantial evidence supported the statutory preference ( 366, subd. (c)(1)) for termination of parental rights and adoption. The juvenile court reasonably concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that the girls met the statutory standard that they were likely to be adopted (ibid.): they were presentable and normal girls already in a foster home where they were thriving and where their adoption was sought.

Next, parents contend that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile courts finding that no exception to the statutory preference for adoption applied.

We review the juvenile courts rulings regarding the section 366.26 exceptions (id., subd. (c)(1)(A)-(E)) for substantial evidence in support of them. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.)

The parent has the burden of establishing an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Daisy D., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 291.)

When determining whether [an] exception applies to bar termination of parental rights, the court balances the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging that a stable family would confer on the child. However, if severing the existing parental relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H. [(1994)] 27 Cal.App.4th [567], 575.) In other words, if an adoptable child will not suffer great detriment by terminating parental rights, the court must select adoption as the permanency plan. (See  366.26, subd. (c)(1).) (In re Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.)

[T]o establish the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the parents must do more than demonstrate frequent and loving contact [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] Rather, the parents must show that they occupy a parental role in the childs life. [Citation.] (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.)

Parents argue that the beneficial relationship ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and sibling relationship (id., subd. (c)(1)(E)) exceptions apply. But substantial evidence supported the trial courts finding that they had not shown a compelling reason (id., subd. (c)(1)) to qualify for either exception. With regard to the beneficial relationship exception: Mother was facing a prison term for the life-threatening injuries Gabriel C. had incurred while in her care, was currently in jail awaiting trial, and could not occupy a parental role in the girls life. Father, after a life of dissolute conduct including great neglect of his parental duties, was only beginning his first tentative steps toward responsible parenthood. Father argues that he presented substantial evidence to the juvenile court that he was now an adequate parent and ready to resume custody. But the question before us is whether substantial evidence supported the contrary conclusion of the court below that he did not occupy a parental role in the girls life, and because there was, we may not disturb its order. Moreover, neither parent had ever acknowledged the gravity of the child abuse that had occurred in the parents home. The court reasonably concluded that their evidentiary showing fell short of the compelling reason standard for excepting them from termination of their parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).

The juvenile courts ruling regarding the sibling relationship exception found in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E), was also reasonable and may not be disturbed on appeal.

In In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 395, we stated that [section] 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) provides an exception to termination of parental rights where termination would cause a substantial interference with the sibling relationship. If termination will substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E) lists numerous factors the juvenile court is to consider in determining whether the circumstance[s] of any given case warrant the application of the exception. First a juvenile court must consider the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, factors such as 1) whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, 2) whether the child shared significant common experiences, or 3) whether the child has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling. If the relationship exhibits some or all of these factors, the juvenile court must then go on to balance any benefit, emotional or otherwise, the child would obtain from ongoing contact with the sibling against the benefit of legal permanence the child would obtain through adoption. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 403.) The key question under Erik P. is whether the relationship between [the siblings] could . . . serve as an anchor . . . to [the childs] past, (id. at p. 404), given the importance of preserving long-standing relationships between siblings which serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil (ibid.).

Substantial evidence in support of the juvenile courts order showed that the girls had remained and were expected to remain with each other, and were the anchors for each other. In essence, there was substantial evidence that Angelina C. and Christina C. were twinned in the sense of having a close, bonded relationship, even though they were not twins in a biological sense. The girls relationships with their other siblings were not as close as their relationship to each other. A social worker reported that the girls had already psychologically begun separating themselves from their biological family, as illustrated by Christina C. telling Angelina C.,  we arent in that family anymore.  The social worker wrote that although the girls have a relationship with their other siblings, the girls do not exhibit any behaviors or verbalize any adverse feelings associated with missing or wanting to see their other siblings. [The girls] appear to now be indifferent about visitations with their other siblings, despite the fact that they enjoy spending time with their other siblings.

Accordingly, there is no basis for this court to set aside the juvenile courts rulings concerning the applicable possible exceptions.

Finally, father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to modify its prior order under section 388, subdivision (a). As noted, father requested that the court modify its order of January 20, 2006, that reunification services be terminated, that a hearing be set under section 366.26, and that visits be set at twice per month.

When a parent appeals the termination of parental rights following a section 366.26 hearing, appealing the termination ruling preserves appeal of a section 388 request discussed at the same hearing. (See In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316-1317.)

We review a juvenile courts ruling on a section 388 request for abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416.) To find an abuse of discretion in a dependency case, the reviewing court must be persuaded that the juvenile courts ruling fell outside the bounds of reason (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319), a high burden to surmount.

Before the juvenile court, the burden was on father by a preponderance of the evidence to show entitlement to relief. (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 415; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 1432(f); see now id., rule 5.570(h)(1).) [T]he juvenile courts task was to determine whether the [father, as the moving party] had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there was new evidence or a change of circumstances demonstrating that it was in [the childrens] best interests that the . . . order . . . be changed, modified or set aside. (In re Jasmon O., supra, at p. 415.)

As noted, father presented evidence that he had, in essence, turned over a new leaf by abandoning the abuse of drugs and finding employment, and was now prepared to assume his parental duties. The juvenile court found that father did not meet his burden in proving that the best interests of the children would be served by granting the requested change. The best interests [inquiry] has to focus on why these particular children would be benefitted, and I did not hear any evidence along these lines aside from the fact that the visitation has gone well. In other words, the court assumed that the circumstances had changed in fathers favor but ruled that he had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that modifying its order would be in the girls best interests.

Fathers claim fails to persuade. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ruling against him. Father relies on the test set forth in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, as did the juvenile court. But the court reasonably decided that Kimberly F. did not apply in fathers favor.

In Kimberly F., the youngest two of the mothers four children were removed from her care and placed with relatives because the home was found to be in an unsanitary and unsafe condition. Although conditions improved somewhat during reunification, the juvenile court found it was not enough and set a section 366.26 hearing. Just before the hearing, the mother filed a section 388 petition, in which she demonstrated that she had been keeping her home in a safe and sanitary condition. The court found no change in circumstances and denied the petition. (Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 526.) Its order was reversed on appeal.

The reviewing court in Kimberly F. found that the reason for denying the modification requestcontinued minor unsanitary conditions in the homewas inconsequential compared to other reasons such as physical or sexual abuse or a parents ingestion of drugs. (In reKimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.) It found the mother had changed the circumstances causing the dependency. Furthermore, the children were clearly bonded to their mother (ibid.) and siblings and were equivocal (at best) (id. at p. 526) about their current placement. The court cautioned against conducting the best interests test by simply comparing the household of the parents with the household of the current caretakers, and thus ignoring the family attachments of the child. A juvenile court must consider the childs interest in preserving the existing family unit, no matter how dysfunctional. (Id. at pp. 529-530.)

The court in Kimberly F. listed a number of factors for the juvenile courts consideration in deciding a section 388 petition. First, the seriousness of the reason for the dependency must be taken into account. Second, the court must look at the strength of the existing bond between parent and child. The strength of the bond to the current caretakers and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system are also vital because the disruption of an existing psychological bond between dependent children and their caretakers is an extremely important factor bearing on any section 388 motion. (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) Finally the court must consider the degree to which the problem precipitating the dependency can be removed and has been removed. Explaining the last factor, Kimberly F. stated, the essence of a section 388 motion is that there has been a change of circumstances. Accordingly, the nature of the change, the ease by which the change could be brought about, and the reason the change was not made before bear on any such motion. (Id. at p. 531.)

Father cannot benefit from Kimberly F. Here the reasons for the dependencyincluding nonaccidental injuries that Gabriel C. was fortunate to survivewere far more serious than the unkempt residence in Kimberly F. Father here had begun to make what the department accurately characterizes as only eleventh-hour efforts to remedy some of his failings, and the juvenile court reasonably, if implicitly, found that his tardiness in attempting to end his abuse of drugs and improve his parenting bore negatively on his request (see In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531 [the reason the change was not made before bear[s] on any such motion].) And the court reasonably, if implicitly, found that other factors militated against granting the request, including the lack of any showing of remorse or acceptance of responsibility for child abuse that occurred in his home and fathers evident reluctance to end his relationship with mother, who had jeopardized her childrens safety and would not acknowledge the fact. We find no abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating David C.s and Cynthia B.s parental rights with regard to Angelina C. and Christina C. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and

denying David C.s request to modify a prior order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 are affirmed.

Duffy, J.

WE CONCUR:

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting, P.J.

McAdams, J.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

[2] The other six children are not the subject of this appeal. They are siblings David C., Jr., who was six years old at the time of the filing of the amended petition, Gabriel C., who was almost two years old, and Monica C., who was born in May 2005, several weeks after the filing of the petition; and three half-siblings: 11-year-old Destiny M., 10-year-old Richard M., Jr., and seven-year-old Isaac M.