In re Scott F.

Filed 3/15/07 In re Scott F. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Harold M. Stanley for Defendant and Appellant Scott S.

George T. Kelley for Defendant and Appellant Cynthia F.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Fred Klink, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appellants Cynthia F. (mother) and Scott S. (father) (collectively appellants), parents of three-year-old Scott F., appeal from an order of the juvenile court declaring Scott to be a dependent of the court under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).^[1] We affirm.

CONTENTIONS

Appellants raise four contentions in support of their argument that the juvenile courts decision to sustain jurisdiction of Scott was improper. Appellants contend that: (1) substantial evidence does not support the trial courts determination that the unsanitary condition of appellants home created a substantial risk that the child would suffer harm; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellants motion to exclude all evidence offered by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and dismiss the action; (3) substantial evidence did not support the trial courts findings that Scott was at risk of serious physical harm inflicted either nonaccidentally by his parents or by reason of their failure to protect him; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellants request for a statement of decision on controverted facts and issues.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The Events Leading Up to the Filing of the Initial Petition Under Section 300

Scott came to the attention of DCFS on June 23, 2005. The police received a telephone call reporting domestic violence at appellants apartment building. Officers arrived at the building shortly thereafter. Long Beach Police Department Officer Joseph Seminara testified that when he arrived at the building, he could hear a woman screaming. He walked around the building until he could determine where the screaming was coming from. He was able to determine that it was coming from appellants apartment. While Officer Seminara was at the back of the apartment with another officer, three officers banged on the front door of the apartment, telling the occupant to open the door. Through the window, Officer Seminara could see a male inside of the apartment. The man refused to open the door, stating that he did not need the police. Officer Seminara then saw a woman and a small child in the apartment, but the male kept yelling at them to go back into the other room, out of Officer Seminaras view. The officers continued a dialogue with the male occupant, whom Officer Seminara identified as father, asking that he open the door so they could check and see if anyone was hurt.

Eventually, the officers forced entry into the apartment. Officer Seminara testified that he entered with his gun drawn. Father refused to obey the officers orders to step outside, and he was ordered to lie on the floor where he was handcuffed.

Officer Seminara testified to the condition of the apartment at the time that the officers entered. Hammers, screwdrivers and wrenches were strewn about on the floor, there was glass on the floor of the living room, the carpet was filthy, and there were plates with food on them in the kitchen. In addition to the window that the officers had broken, another window was broken. A smell of urine was emanating from the carpet or the kitchen, and it appeared the apartment had not been cleaned in weeks. There were ants in the apartment, and flies were circling around inside the rooms.

Officer Seminara asked mother whether domestic violence had occurred that night. She responded that there had been no domestic violence that night. However, in response to Officer Seminaras inquiry as to why she was screaming, she stated that father was in a rage, and that when he was like that, domestic violence would occur. She also stated that domestic violence had occurred in the past. Officers noted that father appeared to be suffering from a drug psychosis, and he was detained for a physical examination pursuant to section 5150.

Father testified that he was watching television in his apartment when he heard a violent pounding on the door. Ten seconds later, police officers broke a window, entered the apartment with guns drawn, and ordered him to get down on the floor. Father said there had been no violent altercation between him and mother.

2. The Section 300 Petition

Janice Harris, at the time a Childrens Social Worker Trainee, prepared a detention report on June 29, 2005. Father was contacted, and he agreed to attend a family team decision making conference. He was told to call back and inform Ms. Harris of when he would be available for the conference, but he did not call back and did not return Ms. Harriss telephone calls. Ms. Harris concluded that there was no parent or guardian capable of caring for Scott.

A petition was filed on Scotts behalf on June 30, 2005, and a jurisdiction/disposition report was prepared for August 1, 2005. The report stated that on June 30, 2005, DCFS had a family team decision making conference which both mother and father attended. Both parents had a history of drug use, and had agreed to enroll in parenting classes that would address anger management, domestic violence, and addiction. Mother agreed to attend a 12-step program three days per week. As of the date of the report, mother had not participated in any of the agreed upon services, and the social worker concluded she did not have any interest in reuniting with Scott. The social worker reported that father had shown the ability to cooperate with DCFS.

The August 1, 2005 report stated that Scott was staying in the home of his paternal grandparents in Long Beach.^[2] It further stated that father admitted that he and mother were arrested for methamphetamine use in 2001 and that both went through an inpatient drug program.

3. The Interim Review Reports

DCFS filed supplemental reports dated October 6, 2005, November 17, 2005, and December 15, 2005. These reports stated that both mother and father were in residential drug programs and were submitting to random drug tests which were negative. Father had found employment at a satellite television company in Torrance, and had been working since September 6, 2005. Father reportedly missed two of his random drug tests between September 2005 and November 2005, and only called the social worker to explain his failure to appear at one of the missed tests. Mother was participating in parenting classes and individual counseling, and both parents were attending domestic violence counseling. Scott continued to live with his paternal grandparents, and both mother and father were visiting him regularly.

A further interim review report dated February 14, 2006 stated that both mother and father continued to do well in their residential treatment programs. Father missed one additional random drug test without explanation, but submitted to five tests. He informed the social worker that his intention was to pick mother up from her drug program when she graduated on February 13, 2006, and take her to their new apartment.

4. The Contested Jurisdiction Hearing

A contested jurisdiction hearing began on February 14, 2006. Over appellants objection, the court admitted into evidence the initial detention report and a police report dated June 23, 2005, with police logs of June 1, and June 8, 2005, attached; the August 1, 2005 jurisdiction/disposition report with various documents attached; a September 7, 2005 Information for Court Officer; and all supplemental and progress reports filed since the case was opened.

At the start of the hearing, the court dismissed six of the 11 counts against appellants. The counts left for adjudication were a-1 (alleging that the altercation between mother and father on June 23, 2005, put the child at risk of serious physical harm); b-1 (alleging that mothers seven-year history of drug abuse and current use of methamphetamine rendered her incapable of caring for the child); b-2 (alleging that fathers history of substance abuse rendered him incapable of caring for the child), b-4 (alleging a failure to protect the child on the grounds that the violent altercation between mother and father on June 23, 2005, endangered the childs physical and emotional health, safety and well-being and created a detrimental home environment); and b-6 (alleging that on June 23, 2005, appellants home was found to be in a filthy and unsanitary condition, which endangered the childs physical and emotional health and well-being and created a detrimental home environment).

After hearing testimony from Ms. Harris, the social worker; Dr. Weiguo Zhu, who examined father at Harbor UCLA Medical Center in Torrance on the night of June 23, 2005; Officer Seminara; the paternal grandparents; father; and mother; and after hearing argument of counsel, the court sustained counts a-1, b-4, and b-6. The matter was continued to March 27, 2006, for a disposition hearing. On March 27, 2006, the trial court ordered that Scott be placed in the home of his parents under supervision of DCFS. Mother and father were ordered to attend and complete a parenting education program and to participate in family maintenance services.

A notice of appeal was filed on April 7, 2006.

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Courts Decision Sustaining Count b-6

Appellants filed a motion under section 350, subdivision (c), to dismiss counts a-1, b-4, and b-6. Section 350, subdivision (c), provides in pertinent part:

At any hearing in which the probation department bears the burden of proof, after the presentation of evidence on behalf of the probation department and the minor has been closed, the court, on motion of the minor, parent, or guardian, or on its own motion, shall order whatever action the law requires of it if the court, upon weighing all the evidence then before it, finds that the burden of proof has not been met. That action includes, but is not limited to, dismissal of the petition and release of the minor at the jurisdictional hearing, the return of the minor at an out-of-home review held prior to the permanency planning hearing, or the termination of jurisdiction at an in-home review.

Appellants first contention is that the trial court erred in denying appellants motion as to count b-6, which alleged that the filthy and unsanitary condition of appellants home on June 23, 2005, endangers the childs physical and emotional health and safety and creates a detrimental home environment and places the child at risk of physical and emotional harm and damage.^[3]The trial court concluded that DCFS met its burden of proving the allegations in count b-6.

The findings of a trial court at a jurisdictional hearing are reviewed under the substantial evidence rule. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 546-547.) Under that rule, the power of a reviewing court begins and ends with a determination of whether there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the finding of the court below. (Ibid.) The burden of proof at a jurisdictional hearing is preponderance of the evidence. (In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)

The trial court had before it a detention report which quoted Officer Seminara as saying, The apartment is horrible, horrible! There were piles of junk, trash, dirty clothes, and debris all over the home. In addition, Officer Seminara testified at the hearing that there were tools and glass on the floor in the living room. He went on, The carpeting was filthy. The kitchen was, plates, old food lying on the counters. There were insects, ants, flies circling the inside of the home. I noticed a strong odor of urine coming from either the carpeting or the kitchen. I was not sure. The house smelled. It had not been cleaned, vacuumed in weeks from what I looked at. No mopping, no cleaning of counters, nothing. Nobody was cleaning.

This evidence was essentially uncontradicted.^[4] Appellants argue, however, that there was no competent evidence that the child had suffered any physical harm or illness, or that there is substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm or illness, by reason of the described condition of the apartment.

Appellants argue that the condition of the home on June 23, 2005, was a result of their efforts to pack up to move out because they were being evicted, and does not establish that the apartment was unsanitary or that the condition of the apartment resulted from the neglectful conduct of appellants. Further, appellants argue, the child was permanently removed from the dirty apartment on the morning of June 24, 2005, at which time he moved to the home of his paternal grandparents. Thus, appellants conclude, there is no evidence that Scott was in danger from the condition of the apartment at any time after June 24, 2005.

In support of their argument, appellants cite In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829, which states that in showing serious physical harm or illness to the minor, or a substantial risk of such harm, the evidence effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur). [Citations.] [Citation.] (See also In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820, [the question is whether substantial evidence supports the finding that the child was, at the time of the hearing, a person described in section 300, subdivision (b) (italics added, fn. omitted)]; In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134 [[t]he basic question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm].) Because the dirty apartment problem was promptly resolved, appellants argue, it was a physical impossibility that the child could be at risk of harm caused by the condition of the apartment at the time of the hearing.

We disagree with appellants suggestion that, in deciding whether to uphold allegations under section 300, subdivision (c), the trial court is limited to an analysis of the conditions to which the child is exposed at the time of the hearing. Instead, the trial court must analyze the nature of the neglectful conduct and determine whether such conduct is likely to reoccur in the future. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396.) Thus, the issue before the court was not limited to whether the condition of the parents former home posed a risk to Scott at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. The court was required to consider whether appellants were likely to endanger him by creating an unsanitary environment in the future in the same way that they did on June 23, 2005.

In denying appellants motion under section 350, subdivision (c), the trial court first considered appellants contention that it was the police officers who caused the disarray in the apartment. The trial court stated, the police officer[s] statements are very clear that the home already looked like that before they broke in. The court concluded, [DCFS] at this point appears to have met their burden by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court apparently considered the fact that, over a period of time leading up to the June 23, 2005 incident, appellants had allowed the home environment to deteriorate to the extent described by Officer Seminara. Appellants point to no evidence that their own housekeeping habits had changed or improved since that time. The fact that Scott was promptly removed from the unclean premises does not foreclose the possibility that appellants will maintain their future home in the same condition as the residence Officer Seminara described on June 23, 2005.

We conclude that Officer Seminaras statements describing appellants residence on June 23, 2005, constituted substantial evidence supporting the trial courts determination that the conditions which existed at appellants home at that time were likely to reoccur in the future.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting DCFSs Exhibits

On January 24, 2006, both mother and father submitted objections to the admission of hearsay evidence contained in DCFSs exhibits, including any social study, report, supplemental, progress report, declaration or similar writing offered or submitted for evidence to the juvenile court in any hearing or proceeding in this matter. The submissions go on to list 13 specific objections to hearsay evidence found in DCFSs exhibits. At the hearing, the court admitted all of DCFSs exhibits, with the following reservation:

Those reports with their attachments are admitted, any statements by people who are not extended within the code will not be admitted, will not be able to be used to sustain the allegations without corroboration and any other documentary evidence.

The court also refused to allow reference to any evidence relating to the dismissed counts. Further, included in the minute order dated February 14, 2006, the court indicated that Any statements . . . made in the reports by people not available for cross examination will not be used to sustain petition without corroboration. Despite the trial courts specific limitations on the use of the documents, appellants argue that the trial court erred in admitting them into evidence.

A. Evidence Relevant to the Sustained Counts

Appellants make two arguments as to why the exhibits should not have been admitted. Their first argument is that any statements, references or allegations in the record, including in Exhibits 1 through 8 and the attachments thereto and the testimony of witnesses that pertains to any of the dismissed counts, as well as hearsay, opinions, conclusions, inferences, and speculations contained therein, are irrelevant and immaterial, constitute inadmissible hearsay, are without foundation and are beyond the scope of the pleadings, and do not provide competent evidence to support counts a-1, b-4, and b-6.

Appellants cite to a long list of examples of evidence that should have been excluded. Such evidence includes, among other things, statements that refer to mothers older child who is under a guardianship; prior contacts with DCFS; and attached records of prior events and convictions. However, appellants have cited nothing in the record which indicates that the trial court considered any of this evidence in sustaining counts a-1, b-4, or b-6.

The court explained its reasons for denying appellants motion to dismiss counts a-1, b-4, and b-6 under section 350, subdivision (c), by pointing to the evidence that the court felt supported those counts. As set forth above, in sustaining count b-6, the court relied significantly on Officer Seminaras statement found in the detention report as to the condition of the apartment on the night of June 23, 2005, and Officer Seminaras testimony in court. In sustaining counts a-1 and b-4, which related to the threat to Scotts safety caused by domestic violence, the court stated that it relied upon a police report signed by Officer R. Areaga. That report indicated that mother had stated that father had been having psychotic episodes, that he raised his fist to her and verbally threatened to harm her, that father kept mother and Scott hostage in the bedroom as officers demanded entry, and expressed the officers conclusion that father was a danger to others.

The trial court admitted the detention report and the police report under section 355. Section 355, subdivision (b), provides:

A social study prepared by the petitioning agency, and hearsay contained in it, is admissible and constitutes competent evidence upon which a finding of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 300 may be based, to the extent allowed by subdivisions (c) and (d).

Section 355, subdivision (b)(2), provides that, The preparer of the social study shall be made available for cross-examination upon a timely request by any party. Section 355, subdivision (c)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

If any party to the jurisdictional hearing raises a timely objection to the admission of specific hearsay evidence contained in a social study, the specific hearsay evidence shall not be sufficient by itself to support a jurisdictional finding or any ultimate fact upon which a jurisdictional finding is based, unless the petitioner establishes one or more of the following exceptions:

(A) The hearsay evidence would be admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding under any statutory or decisional exception to the prohibition against hearsay.

[] . . . []

(C) The hearsay declarant is a peace officer . . . .

(D) The hearsay declarant is available for cross-examination. . . .

The statement in the detention report relied upon by the court was made by Officer Seminara. As a peace officer of the Long Beach Police Department, his statements were properly admitted under section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(C).^[5] He also testified in court and thus was available for cross-examination.^[6] The individual who prepared the report was social worker Janice Harris, who also testified at the hearing and was available for cross-examination. Thus, her report and the statements in it were admissible under section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(D).

The police report signed by Officer Areaga, relied upon by the court in sustaining counts a-1 and b-4, was admissible under section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(C), as statements of peace officers. Officer Areagas police report also contained references to statements alleged to have been made by mother, indicating that threats of domestic violence had occurred on the night of June 23, 2005. We note that these statements were admissible under section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(A), allowing for admission of any evidence that would be admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding, and Evidence Code section 1220, as a party admission.

We conclude that all statements relied upon by the court in sustaining counts a-1, b-4, and b-6 were properly admitted. We decline to consider whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the court did not rely upon. Any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

B. Availability of Specific Individuals for Cross-Examination

Appellants second argument is that the trial court should have excluded DCFSs exhibits because DCFS did not make available for cross-examination all preparers of the social studies. Section 355, subdivision (b)(2), requires that the petitioner have available for cross-examination the preparers of social studies upon the request of any party. Prior to the jurisdiction hearing, appellants requested that Janice Harris, Helene Handler, and Oanh Nguyen be available for cross-examination.

Janice Harris signed each of the social studies admitted into evidence with the exception of exhibit 3.^[7] Janice Harris testified at the jurisdiction hearing and was available for cross-examination. However, appellants objected to the reports at trial on the grounds that Helene Handler and Oanh Nguyen were not presented for cross-examination. The court pointed out that Miss Harris was the official preparer of the reports. The record shows that Helene Handler signed five of the documents as a supervisor, not a preparer.^[8] One other report was signed by Wayne Traylor as supervisor, and one was signed by Mary L. Shyne as supervisor.^[9]

In response to appellants objections at trial that all preparers of the social studies were not available for cross-examination, the court first expressed concern over the timing of appellants request. The court stated, During [DCFSs] case in chief, anyone who wanted to cross examine social workers had a chance to. The preparer of the report came in and was cross examined . . . . [DCFS] rested and youre now making some sort of objection, wanting things stricken from reports after they have already been admitted and you have already had a chance to correct anyone who is a preparer of the report or social worker that you want here. . . . In considering appellants written request filed prior to the hearing, the court pointed out that, while the written request did specifically request Miss Handler, the suggestion that Miss Handler was a preparer of any of the reports was incorrect. The trial court again pointed out that the actual preparer Miss Harris was available for cross-examination.

The trial court allowed appellants to voice specific concerns over their inability to cross-examine Helene Handler. Appellants claimed that Miss Handler interviewed witnesses. The court asked what witnesses she interviewed and appellants attorneys stated she interviewed neighbors at appellants former residence. The trial court stated that it had specifically excluded the statements of appellants former neighbors.

We review the trial courts evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1118.) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellants objections to the admission of DCFSs exhibits because Helene Handler, Wayne Traylor, and Mary Shyne were not made available for cross-examination. Section 355 requires that the preparer of a social study be available for cross-examination ( 355, subd. (b)(2).) Nothing in that section requires that a reviewing supervisor be available for cross-examination if that individual was not involved in the preparation of admitted portions of the report. Under the circumstances of this case, DCFS was not required to make the individuals who signed Janice Harriss reports as supervisors available for cross-examination.

III. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Courts Decision Sustaining Counts a-1 and b-4

Appellants next contend that substantial evidence did not support the trial courts finding of jurisdiction under count a-1, alleging that the child was at risk of serious physical harm, and count b-4, alleging a failure to protect as a result of the threat of domestic violence between mother and father. Appellants contend that there are no supporting facts alleged in the petition that Scott has suffered, or that there is a substantial risk that he will suffer, serious physical harm or illness for any of the reasons stated in the petition.

Appellants acknowledge that there was evidence before the trial court that domestic violence had occurred between appellants. Specifically, Officer Seminara testified that when he interviewed mother to determine whether domestic violence had occurred that night, she responded that it had not. However, upon being asked why she was screaming, mother responded that father was in a rage, and that when he was like that, domestic violence would occur. She informed Officer Seminara that domestic violence had occurred in the past.

Under the substantial evidence standard, all conflicts of evidence must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. (In re Katrina C., supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 547.) In this case, mother was fearful enough of domestic violence that she began screaming to a degree that caused neighbors to call the police. She was still screaming when officers arrived. She later reported a history of domestic violence as the reason for her screams. In addition, fathers behavior caused the officers to be concerned enough about the welfare of mother and Scott that they forced entry into the apartment, and Officer Seminara felt it necessary to enter with his gun drawn. Fathers conduct in denying entry to police officers, who were obligated to check on mothers welfare, also endangered the physical safety of father, mother, and Scott.

We find that the evidence described above is sufficient to uphold the trial courts decision to sustain counts a-1 and b-4.

IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellants Request for a Written Statement of Decision

Appellants filed a joint request for a written statement of decision on March 3, 2006. Appellants requested the court issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision that the minor child [Scott] is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court . . . . On March 27, 2006, the court denied the request. Appellants contend that the denial was error. In support of their argument, appellants cite Code of Civil Procedure section 632, which requires that a trial court issue a statement of decision on controverted issues upon request if the trial is not concluded in one calendar day or less than eight hours. Appellants further cite Code of Civil Procedure section 634, which indicates that when a controverted issue which was brought to the attention of the trial court is not resolved by the statement of decision, it should not be inferred on appeal that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party on that issue. Because the trial court refused to issue a written statement of decision resolving controverted issues, appellants argue that the controverted facts cannot be resolved in favor of DCFS and thus the finding of jurisdiction should be reversed.

However, the courts of appeal have consistently held that Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634 do not apply in juvenile dependency proceedings. In In re Ammanda G. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1075, the Court of Appeal considered an appellants contention that the trial courts failure to provide a statement of decision upon appellants request rendered the findings and orders void. The appellant in Ammanda G. had also cited Code of Civil Procedure section 632 in support of this contention. In concluding that appellants contention lacked merit, the court of appeal stated that Code of Civil Procedure section 632, concerning statements of decision, does not apply to these proceedings. . . . In a juvenile dependency hearing, such as this . . . the court . . . is required only to make a finding, noted in the minutes of the court, whether or not the minor is a person described by the statute as a dependent child . . . [s]pecific findings need not be made; a general finding that the allegations of the petition are true is sufficient to show the facts upon which the court exercises its jurisdiction. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 1081.)

The Ammanda G. court had authority for this conclusion. In In re Paul A. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 928, for example, the appellant argued that he was entitled to make a motion for judgment of acquittal under Penal Code section 1118 or former Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8, which makes references to Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634. In concluding that the appellant had cited no authority allowing him to make such a motion, the Court of Appeal addressed Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The court noted that [s]ection 631.8 contains provisions clearly inapplicable to juvenile proceedings. For example, the requirement that a court which renders a judgment in favor of the moving party shall make findings as provided in Sections 632 and 634 of this code keys into the traditional findings of fact required in civil actions. Such findings are not required in juvenile actions. (In re Paul A, supra, at p. 940.) Further, in In re Billy M. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 973, the Court of Appeal noted, the Juvenile Court Law does not require the making of specific findings and that a general finding that the allegations of the petition are true is sufficient to show the facts upon which the court exercised its jurisdiction to declare the minor a ward or dependent child of the court. [Citations]. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 981.)

We therefore conclude that Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634 do not apply in juvenile dependency proceedings and that the court therefore was not required to issue a written statement of decision.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

____________________, P. J.

BOREN

____________________, J.

DOI TODD

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^[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

^[2] At oral argument, appellants attorneys highlighted the brief removal by DCFS of the child from the paternal grandparents home on June 27, 2005. The record shows that a social worker temporarily removed the child from the paternal grandparents home on that date because the law required that a complete criminal background check and home approval be completed before the child could be placed with the paternal grandparents. The paternal grandfather testified that the child was returned to the paternal grandparents home less than 24 hours from the time he was removed. Appellants have provided no legal authority as to the impropriety of this brief removal, therefore we do not address it.

^[3] Inadequate maintenance of the home environment can be the basis for a juvenile courts assertion of jurisdiction under section 300. (See In re Christopher B. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 608, 611-612; In re Robert P. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 310, 314-315.)

^[4] Both paternal grandparents testified as to the condition of the apartment when they arrived on the morning of June 24, 2005. They described it as small and cluttered and indicated there were toys and other things scattered about on the floor. The paternal grandfather indicated that there were open drawers with clothing and other materials strewn about on the floor, pieces of broken glass on the floor in the kitchen, dirty dishes in the sink and baby bottles on the counter. Mother confirmed that the paternal grandfathers description of the condition of the apartment that morning was accurate. The court could reasonably have concluded that the condition of the apartment was worse the previous evening when Officer Seminara inspected it, since mother testified that both after the officers left on the evening of June 23, 2005, and on the morning of June 24, 2005, she had made efforts to clean the apartment.

^[5] Appellants suggest that section 355, subdivision (c)(1)(C) requires that the peace officers statement be in the form of a declaration under penalty of perjury as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. Appellants cite no authority for this position, and we decline to hold that peace officers must submit their statements in the format set forth in section 2015.5 in juvenile dependency proceedings.

^[6] At oral argument, fathers attorney mentioned that Officer Seminara was called as a rebuttal witness and was not able to be cross-examined. However, the record reveals that both fathers trial attorney and mothers trial attorney had the opportunity to cross-examine Officer Seminara, and both attorneys did in fact cross-examine Officer Seminara. Appellants have provided no citation to the record indicating that they were prevented from questioning Officer Seminara on any subject for any reason.

^[7] Exhibit 3 is described in the minute order of February 14, 2006, as Information For Court Officer dated September 7, 2005. Respondent argues that because appellants have failed to include this exhibit in the record, we should not consider appellants contentions as to exhibit 3. (Barak v. Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 [Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant].) We note that the described document does not appear in the record. A review of the superior court file revealed that the document marked exhibit 3 is a supplemental report dated October 6, 2005, signed by Janice Harris. We have not been able to review the Information For Court Officer dated September 7, 2005, and therefore we decline to consider appellants contentions with respect to this document. However, we also note that the trial court did not rely on any such document or make reference to it in connection with its decision to sustain counts a-1, b-4, or b-6.

^[8] The court determined that Oanh Nguyen prepared the petition and an addendum report which was not admitted into evidence.

^[9] On appeal, appellants complain that Wayne Traylor and Mary L. Shyne were not made available for cross-examination at trial. However, neither of these individuals was mentioned in appellants written requests filed prior to the hearing, nor did appellants name these individuals when objecting to the absence of all preparers of the social studies at the hearing. We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in failing to enforce a request that these individuals appear when no such request was ever made.