Mansdorf v. Mansdorf

Filed 3/15/07 Mansdorf v. Mansdorf CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Irving S. Feffer , Judge. Affirmed.

Cameron, Pearlson & Foster, Paul R. Pearlson, Susan R. Loh; and Martin J. Kirwan for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Benedon & Serlin, Douglas G. Benedon and Gerald M. Serlin for Defendants and Respondents Michele V. Giacomazza, Joint Venture Corporation and Malibu Hills Ranch Corporation.

Alfred R. Keep for Defendants and Respondents Harold Mansdorf, Mildred Mansdorf and the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust.

_________________________

Plaintiff Marylin Mansdorf appeals a judgment entered against her and in favor of defendants and respondents Harold Mansdorf, Mildred Mansdorf, the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust, Michele V. Giaccomazza and his corporations, Joint Venture Corporation and Malibu Hills Ranch Corporation.^[1] This lawsuit grows out of Marylin Mansdorfs claim that in December of 1976, her ex-husband, Lee Mansdorf, orally gave her one half of his interest in the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust.^[2] The trial court, sitting in equity, rejected Marylins claim that Lee made such a substantial oral gift.

On appeal, Marylin contends the trial court unduly and improperly was prejudiced against her by evidence that she had been involved in numerous other lawsuits. We reject this contention, as well as Marylins claims the trial court erroneously admitted the testimony of the defense handwriting expert and rendered an incomplete statement of decision. Because each of Marylins claims fails, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Marylins case.

a. Courtship and marriage of Marylin and Lee.

Marylin was introduced to Lee in 1963 when she was 26 and Lee was 47 years of age. They went on a blind date and just werent apart after that. During their courtship, Lee spoke of his mother, Sadie, his brothers Norman and Harry, and his sister Mildred, but Marylin did not meet any of Lees family and never went to Lees home on Alta Drive in Beverly Hills. Marylin and Lee married on December 11, 1966, in Las Vegas. Marylin previously had been married. No members of Lees family attended the wedding. After their marriage, Lee and Marylin lived in her apartment in Cheviot Hills for approximately six months, then moved to a home they purchased on Edwin Drive in Los Angeles.

b. Sale of aircraft business and creation of the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust.

In 1967, Lee and his brothers Harry and Norman sold their aircraft business and placed the proceeds of the sale into the Mansdorf Family Revocable Trust (the trust), which was created by the three brothers, their mother Sadie and their sister Mildred, on August 31, 1967. Sadie contributed the Alta Drive residence to the trust. Each family member received a percentage interest in the trust. Lee, as trustee, was primarily responsible for the financial affairs of the trust. With the proceeds of the sale of the aircraft business, the trust purchased 1,291 acres of undeveloped land in Malibu.

c. Harassment causes dissolution of the marriage.

Marylin testified that, after she and Lee married, Mildred frequently stopped outside their home, screamed obscenities and yelled Marylin was supposed to get a divorce. Harry and Mildred threatened Marylin in screaming phone calls. Lee found this very upsetting. They obtained an interlocutory dissolution of their marriage in 1968 because Marylin was worried about Lees health.

Lee had a heart attack in 1971. On Sunday, May 9, 1971, Lee telephoned Marylin and said he wanted to go for drive. When Marylin arrived at the Alta Drive home, she heard Harry shouting at Lee to get the divorce. When Lee tried to leave with Marylin, Harry grabbed Marylin by the hair and attempted to punch her but Lee blocked the blow. After this incident, Lee had a second heart attack and was hospitalized for several days. Marylin decided to get a final dissolution because she was afraid Lee would not survive a third heart attack. However, Marylin testified we never considered ourselves divorced ever.

Marylin was not awarded any property or spousal support in the dissolution. Lee occasionally slept at the Edwin Drive home and, after Marylin moved to Motor Avenue in 1972, Lee was there as much as possible. They celebrated wedding anniversaries and birthdays throughout the years. Lee sent Marylin numerous cards and handwritten notes. The cards and notes Marylin produced for trial are just a sample, a few that werent lost.

d. The claimed oral gift.

In December of 1976, Lee went to Marylins apartment to celebrate their 10th wedding anniversary. Lee said, Honey, please sit down, I have something very serious to talk to you about. I am giving you one half of my interest in the family trust and you wont have to worry for the rest of your life about any finances.

After that conversation, Lee began to send Marylin checks from the trust checking account. Marylin made photocopies of some of the checks. The highest amount of any of the checks Marylin was able to locate was $10,000. However, she received larger amounts in other checks. The trust checks Marylin received from Lee were not earmarked for any particular expense.

Lee told Marylin to call his attorney, Rufus Rhoades, if anything happened to him. Lee said Rhodes has the papers and he knows how to take care of everything, everything is all done. Marylin relied on Lees promise by not taking a full-time job and not starting a greeting card business she contemplated. Marylin never asked Lee to see any trust documents because she trusted him absolutely. Over the years, Lee spoke to Marylin about his plan to build a marina on the Malibu property and, when good things happened he would say, remember . . . you have one half of my interest in the trust.

On April 4, and May 20, 2003, Lee sent Marylin trust checks in the amount of $2,000 and $2,500, respectively. Lee went into the hospital on May 27, 2003 and died on June 27, 2003. Marylin was not welcome at the hospital during Lees final illness and did not attend Lees funeral because she was not informed of its location. Rhoades telephoned Marylin and told her Lee had died. In that conversation Marylin told Rhoades what Lee had said about Rhoades having important papers. Rhoades interrupted and said, I dont know where those papers are. On cross-examination, Marylin admitted she did not speak to Rhoades about the papers at any time before Lee died.

At the time of Lees death, the trust owned the Malibu property and the Alta Drive residence and had $611,284 in cash. The trust received an additional deposit of $385,649 at the end of 2003.

2. Defense case.

a. Harrys testimony.

Harry testified he was not aware of Marylin before Lee married her. In 1966, when Lee got married, he packed his clothes and said he was going to move to Marylins house but he returned five or six hours later and never again lived anywhere other than the Alta Drive residence. Harry denied that he made threatening or obscene telephone calls to Marylin and claimed his family did not care one way or the other about Marylin. Harry married and moved to Glendale for 25 years but returned to the Alta drive residence when his wife passed away in 1987. Norman was married for 15 or 16 years. No one in the family objected to Normans marriage or Harrys.

With respect to the incident in 1971, Harry claimed Marylin slapped Sadie for no apparent reason, knocking her false teeth out, and said, This is my house, and I want you all out of my house. Harry admitted he pushed Marylin out the door but denied attempting to strike her.

Lee did not speak of Marylin to Harry after they were divorced and never mentioned that he had given Marylin one half of his interest in the trust. Harry recalled Lee had numerous lady friends during his life and identified a series of checks drawn on the trust payable to one such friend, Janice McClanahan. The family amended the trust on numerous occasions. None of these amendments mentioned Marylin.

b. Testimony of Rhoades.

Rufus Rhoades became the attorney for the trust in 1982. Rhodes prepared wills for Lee and was not aware that Lee also prepared his own handwritten wills. None of these wills mentioned Marylin.

Lee spoke to Rhodes about Marylin on two or three occasions. Rhoadess handwritten notes of a discussion with Lee on October 24, 2001, indicate Lee wanted to leave $500,000 to Janice McClanahan, and wanted to leave money to his ex-wife, referring to Marylin, and to David Schiffs children for schooling. Rhoades testified these notes reflected thinking out loud.

Rhodes last spoke to Lee about Marylin in late May of 2003 when Lee was in the hospital. Lee instructed Rhoades to call Marylin and tell her not to come to the hospital or call him but that he might call her. Lee told Rhoades to call Janice McClanahan and encourage her to call him.

Rhoades complied with Lees instructions and also telephoned Marylin after Lee died. Rhoades recalls Marylin asked if she had been included in Lees will and Rhoades recalls telling her no. Rhoades does not recall speaking to Marylin about being unable to find papers that had been prepared with respect to her. Lee never instructed Rhoades to prepare any documents leaving anything to Marylin upon his death and never said he had given Marylin one half of his interest in the trust.

3. The parties file trial briefs.

At the close of evidence, the trial court ordered the parties to file trial briefs.

Marylins trial brief claimed a 16 percent interest in the trust. Marylin noted Lee and Marylin were married when Lee sold the aircraft business and established the trust. Also, despite Lees success, Marylin did not receive support or property as a result of the dissolution of their marriage. Thus, Lees gift of one-half of his interest in the trust approximated what Marylin would have obtained had they gone through a real dissolution. Marylin argued the numerous trust checks Lee gave her over the years were consistent with Lees duty as trustee to disburse the trusts income to the beneficiaries and demonstrated that Marylin reasonably relied on Lees assurances she would be taken care of.

4. The trial courts oral statement of its decision.

On August 15, 2005, the trial court orally stated its decision. The trial court found Marylins claim comes down to one real issue and that is, is the court to believe the statement that was allegedly made by Lee Mansdorf according to the claims of Marylin. [] The court cant go along with that at all. It belies common sense and the evidence doesnt support it. So in a nutshell her claim that there was an oral gift is denied. [] The argument has been made that theres no contravening evidence and therefore the court should believe what was said by Marylin Mansdorf. Thats an oversimplification of things. Theres a lot . . . going on here. Almost all of them spell out that Lee Mansdorf did not make such a gift. [] Over a period of 17 years I think he gave her approximately ten checks and she made Xerox copies of each and every check. . . . [] It . . . seems to the court based upon the facts as presented at the time of the trial in this matter and common sense, [] he was giving something to a kind of a girlfriend and nothing more. But he certainly wasnt giving her a multimillion dollar trust estate, not at all. [] . . . The various wills, such as they are, dont mention her . . . . [] . . . [] They had a very short marriage. It was about a year and-a-half marriage. None of this was brought up during the course of the marriage. The trial court noted Marylin requested no spousal support or property settlement upon the dissolution of her marriage to Lee, even though it was her second marriage.

The trial court found that, although Lee gave Marylin a few checks in the months preceding his demise, they amounted to a pittance when you think in terms of the volume of the estate. And certainly ten checks over a 17-year period of time doesnt give a lot of credit to the fact that he would be inclined to give her such a tremendous oral gift . . . . The trial court noted the amendments to the trust, even if they were defective, nonetheless indicated that Marylin wasnt being mentioned [when Lee amended the trust]. [] . . . I deny that there was a gift made of the one half of his share of the trust estate at any time. It is not supported by the evidence and common sense. [] So the court finds against Marylin Mansdorf and in favor of the defendants . . . .

5. Subsequent developments.

On September 23, 2005, Marylin objected to the proposed judgment that had been submitted by the defendants and requested sanctions against the defendants counsel and Harry personally for altering the proposed judgment after it had been served. Marylin noted the proposed judgment lodged in the trial court set aside the preliminary injunction issued at the outset of this case to prevent the encumbrance or sale of the Malibu property and the Alta Drive residence, struck the lis pendens previously filed with respect to those properties, dismissed the Mansdorf defendants and the Giaccomazza defendants from the lawsuit, and awarded them costs in the amount of $125,000 and $85,000, respectively. However, the proposed judgment served on the parties did not include any of these provisions.

On September 29, 2005, the trial court overruled Marylins objections and signed the proposed judgment.

On October 12, 2005, Marylin filed a notice of appeal.

On October 17, 2005, Harry filed a motion to set aside the judgment on the ground it was changed after it was served on opposing counsel.

On March 21, 2006, the trial court granted Harrys motion and corrected the judgment to reflect clerical errors in the broadest sense. The amended judgment ordered the preliminary injunction to remain in effect during the appeal. In making that ruling the trial court stated: This is too much of a hot potato that the court could be wrong. And by the time the . . . appellate court corrects [any] error that the court made, everything is gone. [] So I agree with the plaintiff that the two restraining orders should stay in place. This was a close call. This was not just an overwhelming slam dunk. The evidence presented in this case was, in the courts opinion, subject to two interpretations. But the more reasonable interpretation is that which the court followed . . . .

On April 5, 2005, Marylin filed a notice of appeal from the amended judgment.^[3]

CONTENTIONS

Marylin contends the trial court was prejudiced against her by improperly admitted evidence that she had been involved in numerous unrelated lawsuits, and the trial court should have excluded the testimony of the defense handwriting expert who was not listed on the defense witness list. Marylin also contends the statement of decision issued by the trial court failed to state the legal and factual bases for its decision with respect to her claimed breach of oral contract.

DISCUSSION

1. Evidence of Marylins involvement in other lawsuits was properly admitted.

a. Background.

(1) Defense counsels direct and cross-examination of Marylin.

During Marylins case in chief, defense counsel asked whether Marylin and Martin Kirwan, one of the two attorneys who represented Marylin at this trial, had been involved in a series of real estate transactions in the last twenty years? Marylin denied they had. However, Marylin admitted that in 1986 she transferred a piece of real property to Kirwan and his wife during a foreclosure Kirwan handled for Marylin. Marylin testified she bought trust deeds and sometimes had to foreclose.

During the defense portion of the case, Marylin was cross-examined as to whether she and Kirwan had filed approximately 10 lawsuits in Los Angeles County since the early 1980s and whether some of these lawsuits alleged conspiracy theories against attorneys.^[4] The trial court overruled Marylins relevance objection stating, She may be a vexatious litigant, well see. Marylin responded she was uncomfortable answering a question about conspiracy, referring to it as attorney language.

Defense counsel then asked whether Marylin and Kirwan had filed a lawsuit against Hornberger and others in October of 1988 alleging conspiracy and legal malpractice. Marylin responded she did not recall and, in response to the trial courts question, indicated she did not sue the attorney who represented her in the dissolution of her marriage to Lee.

Counsel questioned Marylin with respect to an unverified complaint filed on October 6, 1998, in Los Angeles County Superior Court. Marylin did not recall the circumstances of its filing but recalled she had a case against a contractor for faulty work that settled before trial.

When counsel asked Marylin about a lawsuit filed on September 27, 1996, involving malpractice, not medical or legal malpractice, the trial court again overruled an objection stating, Im only allowing this in to show a pattern of litigation, if any. Marylin responded that, without the names of the other parties, she did not recall the case. The trial court inquired why defense counsel did not have the names of the other parties to the lawsuit. Defense counsel explained his clients had gone to the courthouse to get the records and they did not obtain a copy of the first page of the complaint in many of the cases.

Counsel then asked Marylin about a lawsuit filed on October 31, 1984, seeking civil damages. Again, Marylin could not respond because counsel did not know the name of any other party to the lawsuit. Marylin had the same response with respect to a civil harassment case in which she was a defendant and cross-complainant filed August 22, 1996, a civil lawsuit filed February 18, 1983, and a civil suit filed January 17, 1984. Marylin did however state that she once had to sue a stockbroker who took her stock, but she lost the case. She then had to sue her attorneys for malpractice and won, but then got involved in a dispute among the attorneys over fees.

When asked whether she had filed any lawsuits in Orange County since 1985, Marylin indicated it was difficult to testify with specificity but there had been one or two incidents in Orange County. I just dont have anything to work with here.

(2) The defendants post trial brief.

In their post trial brief, the defendants asked to reopen their case to present evidence they found after the proceedings concluded that indicated Marylin had been involved in 29 lawsuits in Orange County and one lawsuit in San Diego County. In almost every case, Marylin was the plaintiff. The defendants argued these lawsuits showed Marylins litigious history and impeached her testimony that Lee was her source of income after 1977. The defendants offered copies of the first page of the complaint in some of the cases, copies of certificates of destruction of files in other cases and copies of the complaint in other cases.^[5] The defendants also submitted copies of the first page of the lawsuits found in Los Angeles County, as to which Marylin had been cross-examined at trial.

At the outset of the trial courts oral remarks on August 15, 2005, it denied the defendants motion to reopen.

b. Marylins contention.

Marylin contends the evidence of other lawsuits presented by the defendants negatively impacted Judge Feffers assessment of her credibility. Marylin argues this evidence was not relevant because, even had she been shown to be a vexatious litigant, that determination reflected only on her general character and had no tendency to prove or disprove any disputed fact at issue. (Lowenthal v. Mortimer (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 636; Evid. Code, 352, 1101, subd. (a).) Marylin argues this evidence played a significant role in the trial courts decision because Judge Feffer specifically noted in the course of his oral statement of decision: [T]his isnt the little old lady from Pasadena. Shes been involved in litigation. She surely would have done something to protect her rights had there been such a purported gift.

Marylin further notes Judge Feffer specifically acknowledged this was a close case at the time he ordered the preliminary injunction to remain in effect during the appeal. Marylin concludes reversal is required because the improperly admitted evidence tainted the trial courts perception of the case. (White v. White (1890) 82 Cal. 427, 452 [trial courts reliance on irrelevant evidence does not require reversal unless it is shown the trial court relied on the irrelevant evidence]; Wilson v. Manduca (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 184, 190 [reversal is appropriate when improper evidence upon its face tends in any degree to affect the final conclusion of the court ].)

c. Resolution.

With respect to the evidence of unrelated litigation that was presented at trial, no reversible error appears. Relevant evidence means evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid. Code, 210.) The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and its ruling will be upheld on appeal unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the appellant i.e., a showing the courts ruling exceeded the bounds of reason and it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the error. (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431-1432; Continental Dairy Equip. Co. v. Lawrence (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 378, 384.)

Marylins knowledge of the legal system was relevant because it tended to establish her awareness of the availability of legal redress to assert her rights to the trust corpus. Thus, the trial court properly could consider evidence indicating Marylin had been involved in lawsuits after 1983 to demonstrate her knowledge of the legal system. With respect to the lawsuit filed in San Diego and Orange County, the trial court denied the defense request to reopen the case to present evidence of the lawsuits from San Diego and Orange County. Thus, these lawsuits were not part of the evidence adduced at trial.

In order to avoid this impediment, Marylin argues the trial court must have considered the evidence of the San Diego and Orange County lawsuits attached to the defendants trial brief because it reviewed the evidence before rendering its oral statement of decision. However, even accepting Marylins view of the case for the sake of discussion, we conclude this additional evidence did not have any impact on the outcome of the lawsuit. The trial courts finding that Marylin was knowledgeable with respect to the legal system was ancillary to its finding that Lee would not make such a substantial gift without documenting it in some fashion.

Also, evidence of the San Diego and Orange County lawsuits was cumulative to the evidence adduced at trial that demonstrated Marylin was familiar with the legal system. In this regard, Marylin testified she had been involved in various lawsuits including the stockbroker lawsuits, litigation involving the foreclosure of trust deeds by Kirwan and the lawsuit against a building contractor for faulty work. Additionally, Marylin had been married once prior to her marriage to Lee, she testified at her deposition that she previously had been deposed five to ten times and she admitted she had been involved in several lawsuits in Orange County. Thus, the additional evidence proffered by the defense after the trial concluded had no prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial.

The case Marylins relies upon to establish that she was prejudiced by this evidence, Lowenthal v. Mortimer, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d 636, involved the jury trial of a negligence action arising out of a rear-end automobile collision. The trial court permitted the defense to cross-examine the plaintiff with respect to 15 commercial lawsuits. Lowenthal noted that, even in those minority jurisdictions that permit evidence of past personal injury lawsuits at a trial to determine negligence, there was no justification for informing the jury the plaintiff had filed numerous commercial lawsuits. Lowenthal concluded [i]ntroduction of the element of 15 other lawsuits could have had no effect other than to prejudice the jury against the plaintiffs. . . . (Id. at p. 642.)

Tellingly, Marylin substitutes [trier of fact] for the jury in her quotation of Lowenthal, implicitly conceding that any evidentiary error in a court trial must be seen as far less prejudicial than evidentiary error that occurs in a jury trial. In any event, the trial court did not use the evidence of other litigation in any fashion other than to confirm that Marylin was familiar with the court system. Because this finding was secondary to the trial courts primary conclusion that Lee would have documented a multi-million dollar gift of one half of his interest in the trust, any error in the admission of evidence of Marylins involvement in unrelated lawsuits did not taint the trial courts decision in favor of the defendants and must be seen as harmless.

2. The testimony of the defense handwriting expert.

At trial, Marylin contended that, after the defendants were served with the complaint in this case in June of 2004, they fraudulently attempted to thwart Marylins rights by, among other things, fabricating exhibit No. 24, which the defendants claimed was the fifth amendment to the trust. Marylins handwriting expert, Diane Squires, testified Lees signature on exhibit No. 24 was different from Lees other signatures in several respects. Specifically, the usual space between the L and the e in Lee was missing, the M was not as pointed as usual, and the r was a Zaner-Bloser System r rather than Lees usual Palmer method r.

When the defense called Victoria Mertes, a forensic document examiner, Marylin objected that Mertes had not been listed as an expert. (Code Civ. Proc.,  2034.210 et seq.) The trial court overruled the objection and permitted Mertes to testify as a rebuttal witness. Mertes thereafter testified there was a high probability the signature on exhibit No. 24 was Lees. Mertes noted the signature was consistent with other examples of Lees signature. Also, in reaching this conclusion, Mertes took into account the fact Lee may have been on medication at the time he signed exhibit No. 24.

Marylin contends Mertess rebuttal testimony should have been limited to factual impeachment and Mertes should not have been permitted to express an opinion contrary to the opinion reached by Squires. (Mizel v. City of Santa Monica (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1067-1068; Code Civ. Proc., 2034.300 and 2034.310, subd. (b).) As stated in Mizel, an undisclosed expert called on rebuttal may testify that a foundational fact relied upon by another expert is either incorrect or nonexistent, but may not express an opinion that contradicts the opinion of the other expert. Although the distinction between a fact and opinion may be thin, it has to be made. In doing so, trial courts are to strictly construe the term foundation fact so as to prevent a party from offering a contrary opinion of his expert under the guise of impeachment. (Mizel v. City of Santa Monica, supra, at p. 1068.)

Marylin asserts Mertess testimony violated this rule in that Mertes expressed an opinion that directly contradicted Squires opinion. Marylin argues the error was prejudicial because, in making its oral ruling, Judge Feffer noted: The various wills, such as they are, dont mention her, the handwriting expert backs up the fact that the signatures are valid. Thats a question of which expert [is] to be believed. The court believes that Marylin Mansdorfs expert is not accurate and that the expert put forth by the defense was accurate.

However, given that the trial court determined Marylin had no interest in the trust, the question of the validity of any amendment to the trust agreement was entirely irrelevant. Thus, the fact the trial court may have considered the testimony of the defense handwriting expert more persuasive than Marylins expert had no bearing on the outcome of the case. Consequently, an error in the admission of Mertess testimony was harmless.

3. The statement of decision was not incomplete.

Marylin contends that although the statement of decision rejected her claim that Lee made an oral gift of one half of his share of the trust estate, it did not address or respond to Marylins request for an explanation of the legal and factual bases for the trial courts finding Lee and Marylin did not enter into a binding oral contract. Marylin notes the trial court persisted in this error even after she objected to the proposed statement of decision. (McCurter v. Older (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 582, 593-594, disapproved on another point in In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1137.)

The applicable law is well settled. In issuing a statement of decision, the trial court need not address each question listed in a partys request. All that is required is an explanation of the factual and legal basis for the courts decision regarding such principal controverted issues at trial as are listed in the request. [Citation.] [Citations.] (Bandt v. Board of Retirement (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 140, 162, citing Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 67-68.)

Here, Judge Feffer did not believe Marylins testimony that Lee made an oral gift of one half of his interest in the trust. A fortiori, there was no legal basis for an oral contract. Thus, the statement of decision adequately addressed Marylins breach-of-oral contract claim and satisfied Code of Civil Procedure section 632.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P. J.

We concur:

KITCHING, J. ALDRICH, J.

Publication courtesy of San Diego pro bono legal advice.

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^[1] Although sued under the name Harold Mansdorf, it appears the correct name of this defendant is Harry Mansdorf. Accordingly, we shall hereafter refer to him by his correct name.

^[2] We refer to the various members of the Mansdorf family by their first names for purposes of clarity and not out of disrespect. (See In re Marriage of Brinkman (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1284, fn. 1.)

^[3] Marylins appeals have been consolidated.

^[4] In the case at bench, Marylin initially sued Rhoades, Harry, and Mildred for attorney malpractice, conspiracy and punitive damages. On May 21, 2005, Rhoades was dismissed from the action.

^[5] The attachments to the defendants post trial brief indicated Marylin had been involved in the following lawsuits in Orange County:

1. Marylin v. IrvineMedicalCenter, filed on an indiscernible date for breach of written contract and fraud;

2. Marylin v. Home Base, Waban, Inc., et al., filed by Attorney Kirwan on May 23, 1997;

3. Marylin v. Irvine Medical Center, filed by Attorney Kirwan on April 7, 1994 for medical malpractice;

4. Marylin v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, filed by Attorney Kirwan on January 8, 1999, seeking a writ of mandate;

5. Marylin v. Blue Shield of California, Bakul Patel, et al, filed by Attorney Kirwan on December 15, 1994, in Orange County for declaratory relief;

6. A complaint in interpleader filed by a law firm against Marylin and others on March 6, 1996, regarding $38,000 held by the firm as a result of litigation entitled Marylin v. Hews, et al, which settled in Marylins favor in the amount of $873,186.26.

7. FamilyMedicalCenter v. Marylin for unpaid fees sought by Patel, M.D., in small claims filed in November of 1994;

8. Marylin v. Carol Oats and Martin Kirwan, filed December 4, 1998 and dismissed for lack of prosecution on March 7, 2001;

9. Marylin v. Hornberger, et al, including Waban (Home Base) filed April 22, 1999, and dismissed May 15, 2000;

10. Marylin v. Blue Shield and Patel filed September 12, 1994 and dismissed February 13, 1995;

11. Marylin v. Hews, et al., filed May 28, 1991 and dismissed December 23, 1999;

12. The cover sheet from the register of actions in a case entitled Marylin, in pro per, v. Lawrence and Dianne Yanez in which a default was entered for $10,446.99;

13. Marylin v. Coast Cities Esc. filed in March of 2000;

14. Marylin v. Heat & Waves Tanning filed in January of 2000;

15. Marylin and Kirwan v. BCC Remmet Inc., Global Link filed in April of 2005;

16. Marylin v. Waban (Home Depot) filed in August of 2000;

17. Marylin v. Munoz, et al. filed in June of 1995;

18. Marylin v. Home Depot filed in August of 2002;

19. Marylin v. Coats, et al. filed in August of 2002;

20. Marylin v. Orange County filed in December of 2001;

21. Marylin v. K-Mart filed in May of 2001;

22. Marylin v. Unnamed Party filed in July of 2000;

23. Marylin v. Robinson-May filed in July of 2001;

24. Marylin v. Testing filed in December of 1998;

25. Marylin v. Mercury Insurance filed in October of 2001;

26. Marylin v. Payday Loan, Co, filed in March of 2002;

27. Marylin v. Dry Clean Exre filed in August of 2001;

28. Marylin v. Kern, et al filed in October of 2002; and,

29. Marylin v. Blue Shield filed in May of 1995.

In San Diego County:

Marylin v. Camera One filed January 1998.