Camp v. Bear

Filed 2/28/07 Camp v. Bear CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

I. INTRODUTION

Plaintiff and appellant, Edward Camp, sued defendant and respondent Sandra Bear for wrongful eviction after Bear terminated Camps tenancy in order to move back into the San Francisco apartment she had rented to him. Concluding that Camps complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bear. We agree and affirm the judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court relied on the following undisputed facts: In 1989, Camp rented an apartment from Bear. The apartment is located on Gough Street in San Francisco. On March 12, 2002, Bears attorney served Camp with a 30-day notice terminating his tenancy. This notice informed Bear that Camp intended to recover possession of the apartment because she wanted to use it as her principal place of residence. Camp moved out of the apartment on April 12, 2002. On March 12, 2004, two years after the eviction notice had been served on him, Camp sued Bear, claiming damages for negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful eviction.

Bear answered the complaint and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 399.^[1] Bear filed a summary judgment motion making the same argument. The trial court concluded that Camps complaint was barred by the one-year limitation period of section 340, subdivision (a) and, on November 29, 2005, granted the summary judgment motion. The court entered judgment on January 20, 2006 and this timely appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We apply the usual standard of review to judgments granting summary judgment. In so doing, we independently assess whether the trial courts ruling is correct, applying the same legal standard employed by the trial court. (Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 579 (Union Bank).)

On summary judgment, a defendant has the burden of proving that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583; 437c, subd. (o)(2).) If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists . . . . (Union Bank at p. 583.) A plaintiff who opposes a summary judgment motion is not permitted to rely on allegations or denials of the pleadings. Instead, the plaintiff must set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists . . . . (Ibid.)

Like the trial court, we construe the moving partys affidavits strictly, construe the opponents affidavits liberally, and resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing it. (Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201-1202.)

B. The San Francisco Rent Ordinance

Plaintiffs complaint for damages is based on his allegedly wrongful eviction from his San Francisco apartment. Under section 37.9, subdivision (a), of the San Francisco Administrative Code, Bear was permitted to terminate Camps tenancy only for just cause. A landlords intention to recover possession of the premises for his or her own use and occupancy constitutes just cause. However, a landlords failure to recover possession within three months creates a rebuttable presumption of bad faith. (S. F. Admin. Code, 37.9, subd. (a)(8)(v).) Therefore, under the San Francisco Administrative Code, Bear was required to move into the premises within three months after Camp moved out, or by July 12, 2002.

C. The Summary Judgment Motion

Bears summary judgment motion was based entirely on the argument that Camps complaint is time barred. Camps complaint is subject to the one-year statute of limitations set out in section 340, subdivision (a). (Sylve v. Riley (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 23, 26, citing former section 340, subdivision (1).)

The essential facts bearing on the date by which Camps complaint should have been filed are not disputed: (1) Camp received the 30-day eviction notice terminating his tenancy on March 12, 2002; (2) he vacated the premises on April 12, 2002; and (3) Bear was required to move into the apartment by July 12, 2002.

Camps claim for wrongful eviction accrued one year after July 12, 2002, the day Bear was required to -- and allegedly did not -- take possession of the apartment. On that day, Bears eviction of Camp was rebuttably presumed to have been done in bad faith, and the statute of limitations on Camps claim began to run. Camps complaint should have been filed on or before July 12, 2003. Because it was not filed until March 12, 2004, it is time barred.

Bear thus met her burden of proving that there is a complete defense to Camps complaint. (Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583; 437c, subd. (o)(2).) Having met that burden, the burden then shifted to Camp to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists . . . . (Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583; see also Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.)

Camp, however, argues that the burden did not shift to him to show facts related to why the statute of limitations did not begin to run on July 12, 2002. Rather, he argues that Bear was required to establish that no such facts exist. More specifically, he argues that Bear had the burden of showing that he (Camp) knew or should have known of Bears alleged failure to occupy the unit more than one year before the complaint was filed. In other words, Camp argues that Bear had the burden of showing that, even under the delayed discovery rule, his complaint was still untimely.

This is incorrect. Once Bear established a complete defense to the complaint, Camp was required to show that the statute of limitations was extended under some applicable rule -- in this case, the delayed discovery rule.

Under the delayed discovery rule, the limitations period does not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers or could have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence all facts essential to her cause of action. [Citation.] (Sylve v. Riley, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) Therefore, in his opposition to Bears summary judgment motion, Camp was required to set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists (Union Bank, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 583) about when he discovered or could have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence the facts essential to his claim, that is, that Bear had not moved back into her apartment by July 12, 2002.

This he failed to do. Camp alleged in his complaint that [o]n or about July 15, 2003, plaintiff discovered that defendant, Sandra Bear, had not moved into the premises. However, in his response to defendants separate statement of undisputed material facts he proffered not a single fact related to the date of his discovery. Rather, Camp simply admitted the material facts on which Bears motion was based.

While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper. [Citation.] (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.) Here, the uncontradicted facts establish that the statute of limitations in this matter ran on July 12, 2003. Because Camps complaint was filed on March 12, 2004, it is time barred and summary judgment was properly granted.^[2]

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Haerle, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Kline, P.J.

_________________________

Lambden, J.

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^[1]All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise noted.

^[2]Because we affirm the trial court on this ground, we do not reach the question of whether the trial court erred in also concluding that the eviction notice was facially invalid and that because the statute of limitations began to run upon service of a facially invalid eviction notice, Camps complaint should have been filed within one year of March 12, 2002, the date the eviction notice was filed.