BROWN v.TEHAMA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

Filed 3/16/07 (appen. not included with computer version)

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION^*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Tehama)

----

STORY CONTINUED FROM PART I

The first deed in the 1904 land exchange was executed on January 7, 1904. In that deed, Garrett and Tinkham conveyed the parts of the two parcels they owned in section 10 that lay north of Ridge Road to Charles Hesse by a single metes and bounds description^[1]that did not refer to the two existing parcels from which the land was taken.^[2]

The parties disagree about the number of parcels conveyed in this deed. KAKE and the county defendants contend the deed conveyed two new parcels to Charles Hesse -- specifically, those parts of the two parcels Garrett and Tinkham owned in section 10 that lay north of Ridge Road (we will refer to these as fractional parcels). The People, on the other hand, contend the deed conveyed only a single new parcel -- the parcel described in the deed. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the People.

In the construction of boundaries, the intention of the parties is the controlling consideration. [Citation.] Whenever possible, a court should place itself in the position of the parties and ascertain their intent, as in the case of any contract. As stated in Miller & Lux, Inc., v. Secara, 193 Cal. 755 [227 Pac. 171], Intention, whether express or shown by surrounding circumstances, is all controlling . . . (Machado v. Title Guarantee and T. Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 180, 186.)

[E]xtrinsic evidence is always admissible to explain the calls of a deed for the purpose of their application to the subject-matter, and thus to give effect to the deed. [Citation.] In construing a doubtful description in a grant, the court must assume as nearly as possible the position of the contracting parties, and consider the circumstances of the transaction between them, and then read and interpret the words used in the light of these circumstances. (Thompson v. Motor Road Co. (1890) 82 Cal. 497, 500.)

Here, no party points to any evidence of surrounding circumstances that would assist in divining the intent of the parties to the various transactions at issue, including the 1904 deed from Garrett and Tinkham to Charles Hesse. As for the deed itself, there is nothing in it suggesting Garrett and Tinkham intended to convey two new fractional parcels to Charles Hesse, as opposed to a single new parcel. The deed contains a single metes and bounds description of what by all appearances is one tract of land. As the People point out, the deed does not make any reference to the old patent parcel boundary that . . . divide[d] the original holdings of Tinkham and Garrett in section 10. Furthermore, the deed specifies that what is being conveyed is all that certain lot and parcel of land which the deed then goes on to describe. (Italics added.) Before it was filled out, that part of the preprinted deed looked like this: all th___ certain lot__ and parcel__ of land. Had Garrett and Tinkham intended to convey two parcels instead of one, they could have filled out the deed to convey all those certain lots and parcels of land thereafter described, but they did not do so. Instead, they filled the blank after the th with at to create the word that and put small lines through the blanks after lot and parcel showing that they intended to use the singular of those words, rather than the plural. Thus, by all appearances, the deed conveyed a single new parcel created from parts of the two parcels Garrett and Tinkham owned in section 10, rather than two new parcels, each created from one of those parts.

Both KAKE and the county defendants suggest we should not be so quick to infer an intent on the part of Garrett and Tinkham and Charles Hesse to (as the county defendants put it) destroy old parcel boundaries and entirely subsume them within the new ones because the combination of parts of existing parcels into a single new parcel would make the land involved less valuable. On this point, KAKE observes that [m]erger [of the parts of the existing parcels] would result in a loss of the landowners right later to divide the property without complying with then-applicable subdivision laws. While that is certainly true, if we look to the state of the law in Tehama County in 1904, we find no reason that Charles Hesse would have been concerned about later difficulties in dividing the property he received from Garrett and Tinkham.

Californias first subdivision map statute was enacted in 1893 (Stats. 1893, ch. 80, 1, p. 96; see Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 761), but it was not until the 1970s that divisions of land in which only four or fewer parcels were created (minor subdivisions) were subject to statewide regulation. (See vant Rood v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 549, 565-566.) Although such divisions of land still could be regulated by local ordinance (Stell v. Jay Hales Development Co. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1224), Tehama County did not have an ordinance regulating minor subdivisions before 1972. What this means is that in 1904 there would have been no reason for Charles Hesse to be concerned that Garrett and Tinkham were conveying only one parcel to him, because the law at the time allowed him to divide that parcel into two, three, or even four parts and sell those parts separately without any restriction. No party offers any reason why Charles Hesse should have anticipated a change in the law that would have restricted his right to divide his property.^[3] Given this circumstance, we find no reason to believe Garrett and Tinkham intended to convey two new fractional parcels to Charles Hesse rather than the single new parcel described in the deed.

KAKE attempts to avoid this conclusion by relying on the antimerger rule in Civil Code section 1093. KAKE contends that finding an intent to obliterate the previous patent boundaries from use of the metes and bounds deed[] would make Civil Code section 1093 irrelevant, and under Civil Code section 1093 [t]he use of a metes and bounds deed does not result in merger of jointly described parcels.

KAKE reads the statute too broadly. As the People point out, Civil Code section 1093 concerns only those situations where one party is conveying entire pre-existing parcels in a consolidated description and does not apply to situations where portions of pre-existing parcels, never before described separately, are being conveyed. KAKE contends this is a creative interpretation of the language of [Civil Code] section 1093 that is not supported by citation to any authority. KAKE is correct on the latter point, but no citation to authority is necessary when, as here, the statutory language is clear. (See DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction].) Undeniably, by its plain terms, Civil Code section 1093 applies only when two or more separate and distinct legal descriptions of real property contained in one or more [previous] instruments of conveyance or security documents are later consolidated in a subsequent . . . instrument of conveyance or security document, either by an individual listing of the legal descriptions or a consolidated legal description comprised of more than one previously separate and distinct legal description.

Here, no separate and distinct legal description of either of the fractional parcels KAKE contends Garrett and Tinkham conveyed to Charles Hesse is contained in any previous instrument of conveyance or security document. It necessarily follows then that the 1904 deed from Garrett and Tinkham to Charles Hesse does not contain an individual listing of [any previously separate and distinct] legal descriptions of those fractional parcels or a consolidated legal description comprised of more than one previously separate and distinct legal description of those fractional parcels. Under these circumstances, the rule stated in Civil Code section 1093 simply does not apply.

The county defendants contend that even if Civil Code section 1093 does not directly apply to transfers of fractions of separate parcels, it is certainly a persuasive determination, in an analogous setting, that the use of a single legal description does not evince an intention to merge heretofore separate pieces of land. Thus, even though Civil Code section 1093 does not apply here, the county defendants would have us reach the same result that Civil Code section 1093 would compel if it did apply because the statute is presumably representative of a consistent body of law with consistent purpose and effect.

This is a rather remarkable contention. In effect, without citing any legal authority in support of their position, the county defendants would have us conclude that California common law provides (and has long provided) an antimerger rule identical to the one set forth in Civil Code section 1093, except that (unlike Civil Code section 1093) it applies to fractional parcels that have never before been described separately in any security document or instrument of conveyance. According to the county defendants, such a rule must exist (even though we have been given no evidence of it) because otherwise major landowners . . . would routinely surrender their successors ability to separately use and sell portions of their land, to their potentially severe financial detriment.

We are not inclined to create a rule of common law from whole cloth and apply it to transactions that occurred more than 100 years ago. Moreover, we are particularly reluctant to extend the rule stated in Civil Code section 1093 to situations beyond the scope of the statutory language because, notwithstanding the Legislatures assertion in the statute, we have reason to question whether the rule stated in the statute actually existed before the statute was enacted. No one has cited, nor have we found, any authority (other than Civil Code section 1093 itself) supporting the assertion that before 1986, a consolidated legal description used in a deed to convey two or more parcels that had previously been separately and distinctly described in one or more instruments of conveyance or security documents could not be deemed to merge the preexisting parcels absent an express written statement of the grantor contained in the later deed. In other words, we have found no evidence that the rule stated in Civil Code section 1093 was the law before the statute was enacted. As far as we can determine, historically the law that governs the interpretation of deeds has been that the intention of the parties is the controlling consideration (Machado v. Title Guarantee and T. Co., supra, 15 Cal.2d at p. 186), and [i]n construing a doubtful description in a grant, the court must assume as nearly as possible the position of the contracting parties, and consider the circumstances of the transaction between them, and then read and interpret the words used in the light of these circumstances (Thompson v. Motor Road Co., supra, 82 Cal. at p. 501). This law did not make an express statement of merger by the grantor an absolute prerequisite to finding an intent to merge two or more previously separate parcels.

The Legislatures assertion that a statute is declaratory of existing law does not make it so, if the law found in the code books and case books does not in fact support that assertion. Nevertheless, because the validity of Civil Code section 1093, as it applies to the situations specifically described in the statute, has no bearing on the outcome of this case (as will be shown), we need not actually determine whether the Legislatures assertion in the statute was accurate. We do, however, conclude the apparent absence of any law consistent with the antimerger rule in Civil Code section 1093 prior to the statutes enactment is further reason for us to decline the county defendants request that we recognize an analogous antimerger rule that applies to fractional parcels that have never before been separately and distinctly described, and that we apply that rule to transactions that occurred more than 100 years ago.

Based on the foregoing reasoning, we conclude that in 1904 when Garrett and Tinkham conveyed to Charles Hesse that portion of their property in section 10 lying north of Ridge Road using a single metes and bounds description and identifying the property conveyed as that certain lot and parcel of land, they intended to convey to Charles Hesse the single parcel they described in the deed to him and not two fractional parcels that were not then (and have never since been) separately described.

The foregoing conclusion disposes of the property in the eastern half of section 10 that is included in Burr Valley Estates -- it consists of one parcel, not two. This takes us to the second deed in the 1904 land exchange and the property in the western half of section 10. On January 12, 1904, Charles Hesse conveyed to B. A. Bell the parts of the two parcels he owned in the west half of section 10 lying south of Ridge Road. We are not concerned here with the property Charles Hesse conveyed to Bell, as that property -- like the other property in section 10 south of Ridge Road -- is not part of Burr Valley Estates and therefore not at issue here.^[4] What is at issue here is the property that Charles Hesse retained.

We conclude the property Charles Hesse retained consisted of two distinct parcels -- specifically, the remainders of the two parcels off of which he carved the land south of Ridge Road to give to Bell. Indeed, the People do not argue otherwise. Instead, they contend the facts of this case make th[e] inquiry [into whether one or two parcels remained] irrelevant because [i]n every case where a landowner conveyed out fractions of pre-existing parcels, the landowner later conveyed out the remainder fractions as well. According to the People, the later conveyance has the same legal consequences as the 1904 conveyance from Garrett and Tinkham to Charles Hesse -- even if Charles Hesse retained two parcels instead of one, his later use of a single legal description to convey those two previously undescribed parcels, without reference to the preexisting patent parcel lines, demonstrates an intent to merge those parcels into one.

We turn to Charles Hesses disposition of what remained in the west half of section 10 after his 1904 conveyance to Bell to determine if that is so. After Charles Hesse conveyed the land south of Ridge Road to Bell, he was left with the remainder of each of the two parcels north of the road. In 1918, he and his wife conveyed that land, along with other land, to Albert Montgomery in a deed that described the land as all those certain lots and parcels of land, situate, lying and being in the County of Tehama, State of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to-wit: All of fractional Section Four (4), all of Section Nine (9), the West half of the Northwest quarter (W 1/2 of NW 1/4), the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter (SE 1/4 of NW 1/4), the North half of the Southwest quarter (N 1/2 of SW 1/4), and all that part of the South half of the Southwest quarter (S 1/2 of SW 1/4), lying North of the Ridge Road in Section Ten (10). All that part of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter (NW 1/4 of NW 1/4) lying North of the Ridge Road, in Section Fifteen (15), all in Township Twenty-six (26), North of Range Five (5) West, M.D.M., and containing 1698 acres, more or less. (Italics added.) (See appen., p. 2.)

The italicized portion of the legal description above describes the property in section 10 north of Ridge Road that Charles Hesse conveyed to Montgomery. The Peoples position is that because this description does not retain any reference to the old patent parcel boundary which used to lie within the remainder parcel, the remainder parcel that was conveyed to Montgomery [w]as just one parcel. KAKE counts this property as two parcels because there is no language of merger in the deed, and therefore under Civil Code section 1093, the two preexisting parcels were not merged by the conveyance to Montgomery. Civil Code section 1093 does not apply, however, because the two parcels at issue -- what remained after Charles Hesse conveyed his land in section 10 south of Ridge Road to Bell -- were never separately and distinctly described in any instrument of conveyance or security document. Moreover, as we have explained already, we have found no basis for recognizing the existence of a rule like that in Civil Code section 1093 that applies to fractional parcels that have not been so described. Accordingly, we are left with nothing more than the description in the deed to ascertain whether Charles Hesse intended to convey the undescribed fractional parcels or the one parcel actually described in the deed.

We conclude the latter answer is correct. Although this deed (unlike the 1904 deed discussed above) refers to all those certain lots and parcels of land, the use of the plural is explained by the fact that in addition to conveying the land in section 10 to Montgomery, Charles Hesse also conveyed to him in this deed various other parcels -- specifically, parcels in section 4, section 9, and section 15. Under these circumstances, absent anything in the deed or any extrinsic evidence suggesting Charles Hesse intended to maintain the parcel boundary that previously separated the two fractional parcels he retained in the west half of section 10 after conveying the land south of Ridge Road to Bell, we conclude the property in the west half of section 10 that is now part of Burr Valley Estates consists of one parcel, not two.

2. Section 34

We turn now to section 34. That section was originally comprised of eight separate parcels created by federal patents.^[5] By 1907, Charles Hesse owned all eight parcels, including two parcels comprising the southeast quarter of the section -- namely, the north half of the quarter and the south half of the quarter. In 1908, he conveyed to Frances Hesse 100 acres in the southeast quarter of the section, which the deed described by metes and bounds without reference to the two existing parcels from which the land was taken. Essentially, what was conveyed were portions of the existing parcels lying: (1) south of a road (Johnson Road) running roughly east to west near the northern boundary of the quarter; and (2) east of a line running from the road to the south boundary of the quarter.^[6] (See appen., p. 3.)

The parties disagree about the number of parcels conveyed in this deed. KAKE contends that in making this conveyance, Charles Hesse cut pieces out of [the two existing] parcels . . . , creating two new legal parcels, which he conveyed to Frances Hesse. The county defendants agree. The People, on the other hand, contend Charles Hesse conveyed only a single new parcel to Frances Hesse -- the parcel described in the deed.

For the reasons set forth above in connection with our analysis of section 10, we agree with the People. The deed to Frances Hesse described a single lot and parcel of land without reference to the boundary between the preexisting parcels from which the new parcel was taken. Absent anything in the deed or any extrinsic evidence suggesting Charles Hesse intended to maintain that parcel boundary, we conclude Charles Hesse intended to convey the single parcel he described in the deed to Frances Hesse, and not two fractional parcels that were not then (and have never since been) separately described.

In 1910, Charles Hesse conveyed another 100 acres south of Johnson Road to Frances Hesse, again using a metes and bounds description without reference to the existing parcels from which the land was taken.^[7] (See appen., p. 3.) KAKE contends this deed created nine parcels where there were five before. For the reasons set forth above, KAKE is mistaken. Like the 1908 deed, the 1910 deed to Frances Hesse described a single lot and parcel of land without reference to the boundaries between the preexisting parcels from which the new parcel was taken. Absent anything in the deed or any extrinsic evidence suggesting Charles Hesse intended to maintain those parcel boundaries, we conclude Charles Hesse intended to convey the single parcel he described in the deed to Frances Hesse, and not five new fractional parcels that were not then (and have never since been) separately described.

That brings us to what happened to section 34 after 1910. Following his two deeds to Frances Hesse, Charles Hesse continued to own three of the original patent parcels in that section and the fractional remainders of four others. In 1913, Charles Hesse conveyed all of that land, along with other land in section 33, to R. L. Douglas by conveying all those certain lots and parcel [sic] of land, situate, lying and being in the County of Tehama, State of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to wit: [] All of Section thirty three (33) in Township twenty seven (27) North Range Five (5) West M. D. M. and all of Section thirty four (34) of said Township, and Range, except Two Hundred (200) acres thereof heretofore deeded by party of the first part to Frances Hesse. (Italics added.) (See appen., p. 4.)

KAKE contends that the italicized language in this deed conveyed seven parcels to Douglas -- the three original patent parcels and the four fractional parcels that Charles Hesse owned after his 1910 deed to Frances Hesse. The People contend the italicized language conveyed only one parcel to Douglas because it merged all of Charles Hesses remaining land in section 34 into one new parcel, even though that land included the entirety of three pre-existing patent parcels. (Italics omitted.) Recognizing that this position presents a potential conflict with the antimerger rule in Civil Code section 1093, the People assert that even if the boundaries of the three pre-existing parcels wholly contained in the conveyance should today be honored, that would only add three to the States parcel count, raising it to 24, which still means the Countys lot line adjustment for KAKE [was] illegal. (Italics omitted.)

We need not decide which position is correct, however, because even if KAKE is correct in asserting that the 1913 deed conveyed seven parcels to Douglas, it makes no difference in the outcome of the case. Based on our previous analysis, accepting KAKEs position on the 1913 deed would result in only nine parcels in section 34 -- the two conveyed in 1908 and 1910 to Frances Hesse and the seven conveyed in 1913 to Douglas. As we will explain, nine parcels in section 34 is not enough to bring the total number of parcels in Burr Valley Estates to 29 before the lot line adjustment, which is a prerequisite for KAKE and the county defendants to prevail on their appeals from the judgment.

3. Sections 5 And 32

The reason for this result lies in the parcel counting in sections 5 and 32. As noted above, the People contend there were 2 parcels in sections 5 and 32, while KAKE contends there were either 5 or 8 parcels in those sections. Again, we agree with the People.

The history of the lands in sections 5 and 32 is complicated. For our purposes, however, we need only focus on a portion of that history. By 1936, all of the land in sections 5 and 32 (along with other land in sections 6 and 31) was owned by the estate of Mandus Johnson. (See appen. p. 5.) In April 1936, the executors of the estate conveyed all of that land to Andrew Jr., Silas, Olaf, and Malen Johnson. By 1944, following a series of conveyances, Andrew Jr. owned an undivided one-quarter interest in the property and Silas owned an undivided three-quarters interest in the property. (See appen., p. 6.) Then, in 1948, in an action filed by the executors of Andrew Jr.s estate against Silas and others, the Tehama County Superior Court entered an order partitioning the property (known as Burr Valley Ranch) between Silas and his wife and Andrew Jr.s heirs. As the People point out, Insofar as is pertinent here, Silas Johnson obtained a parcel consisting essentially of the west half of section 5, while [Andrew Jr.s heirs] obtained a parcel that consisted essentially of the east half of section 5 and a part of the east half of section 32. (See appen., p. 6.) The order described the property given to Andrew Jr.s heirs as the following portion of Burr Valley Ranch, followed by a metes and bounds description that did not reference any preexisting patent parcel lines, then described the property given to Silas and his wife as the remaining portion of said Burr Valley Ranch, likewise followed by a metes and bounds description that did not reference any preexisting patent parcel lines. (Italics added.) The order also noted that various issues and questions were reserved for future determination, including [w]hether the Court shall determine that the owners of the respective portions of the Burr Valley Ranch, as partitioned and divided herein, shall bear equally the costs of a division fence between said two parcels as herein partitioned when such fence is constructed. (Italics added.)

The People contend the partition decree created two new parcels that are entirely independent of any prior parcelization in the two relevant sections. KAKE, on the other hand, contends the partition resulted in 4 parcels in section 5 because of the continued existence of parts of the original patent parcel boundaries. Again, however, KAKEs contention relies on Civil Code section 1093, but the rule in Civil Code section 1093 does not apply here because the property at issue consisted only of fractional parcels, and we have found no basis to recognize the existence of a rule analogous to the one found in Civil Code section 1093 that applies to fractional parcels. Under these circumstances, we agree with the People that before the lot line adjustment sections 5 and 32 contained two preexisting parcels, rather than the 5 to 8 parcels KAKE advocates.

It is because of this result that we need not decide whether the 1913 deed from Charles Hesse to Douglas of land in section 34 conveyed 1, 4, or 7 parcels. Even if it conveyed the greater number, the total number of parcels in Burr Valley Estates immediately before LLA 98-46 would have been only 27 -- 5 in section 4, 1 in section 9, 1 in section 15, 7 in section 33, 2 in section 10, 2 in sections 5 and 32, and 9 in section 34 (7 conveyed in 1913, plus the 2 parcels conveyed to Frances Hesse). Since this is fewer than the 29 parcels created by the lot line adjustment, the trial court correctly concluded the adjustment was not exempt from the Subdivision Map Act. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.^[8]

TO BE CONTINUED AS PART III..

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^* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part I of the Discussion, which includes the appendix.

^[1] A metes and bounds description gives the boundary lines of the property with their terminal points and angles. Essentially, it is any description other than by reference to particular lots and parcels on a recorded subdivision map. (74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 149, 150, fn. 2 (1991).)

^[2] Specifically, the deed conveyed all that certain lot and parcel of land, situate, lying and being in the County of Tehama, State of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to wit: [] Beginning at a point in the center of the Ridge Road from which point the corner to sections 10-11-14 and 15, in Township 26 N. R. 5 W. M. D. M., bears South 17.45 chains, thence following along the center of said Ridge Road by the following courses and distances: North 64Ëš 30 West 5.40 chains, South 77Ëš West 3.57 chains, South 62Ëš West 3.72 chains, North 73Ëš West 3.17 chains, North 57Ëš West 6.15 chains, North 71Ëš 30 West 7.48 chains, South 51Ëš West 8.40 chains, South 50Ëš 30 West 900 chains to the center line of said Section 10, thence North on said center line 46.57 chains, more or less, to the North West corner of the South Half of the North East Quarter of Said Section 10; thence East 40.00 chains, more or less, to the line between Sections 10 & 11, thence South on said Section line 42.55 chains, more or less, to the place of beginning, containing 160 7/10 acres, more or less.

^[3] Indeed, KAKE asserts elsewhere that land owners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could never have predicted the States increasing control over, and restriction of, development. Given this assertion, it is difficult to imagine why the parties to the 1904 transaction would have been concerned about maintaining existing patent parcel boundaries as a means of protecting themselves against future regulation they could never have predicted.

^[4] For the same reason, we are not concerned with the third deed in the land exchange, which involved Tinkhams and Bells conveyance of the remainder of their property in section 10 south of Ridge Road to Bell.

^[5] One of the federal patents included land outside of section 34, but the parcel created by that patent was later divided when the portion of the parcel within section 34 was conveyed to another owner, and only the portion in section 34 is part of the property at issue here.

^[6] Specifically, the deed conveyed all that certain lot and parcel of land, situate, lying and being in the County of Tehama, State of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to wit: [] Beginning at the south-east corner of Section Thirty-four (34) in Township Twenty-seven (27) North of Range Five (5) West M. D. B. & M. Thence north 35.22 chains to the center of the County Road: - thence following along the center of the County Road, North 74 1/2Ëš West 4.48 chains: thence South 74Ëš West 5.00 chains:- Thence North 88 3/4Ëš West 6.12 chains: thence North 79 1/2Ëš West 5.20 chains:- Thence North 45Ëš West 4.00 chains. Thence North 82 1/4Ëš west 2.56 chains:- thence south 72Ëš West 1.97 chains:- thence south 38.69 chains to the south line of said section Thirty-four (34):- thence east along said line 27.54 chains to the place of beginning, and containing 100 acres.

^[7] Specifically, the deed conveyed all that certain lot and parcel of land, situate, lying and being in the County of Tehama, State of California, and bounded and particularly described as follows, to wit: [] Beginning at a point on the South line of Section 34, in Township 27 North, of Range 5 West M. D. M., said point being 27.54 Chains West of the South east Corner of said Section 34, thence North 38.69 Chains to the Center of the County Road, Known as the Johnson Road, thence following along the Center of said Road South 71Ëš West 4.35 Chains thence North 68Ëš West 2.77 Chains, thence North 49Ëš West 4.64 Chains, thence North 74Ëš West 2.23 Chains, thence North 88Ëš West 8.25 Chains, thence North 82 3/4Ëš West 4.00 Chains thence South 43.10 Chains to the South line of said Section 34, thence North 89 1/4Ëš East 24.57 Chains to the place of beginning, and Containing 100 acres, more or less.

^[8] Because the trial court correctly concluded the lot line adjustment had to comply with the Subdivision Map Act, we need not address the Peoples alternate argument that, even if the lot line adjustment was exempt from the Subdivision Map Act, findings were required under section 51257 of the Williamson Act.