Golden GateReg.Center v. Sup. Ct.

Filed 3/22/07 Golden Gate Reg. Center v. Sup. Ct. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Petitioner Golden Gate Regional Center (GGRC) petitions this court for a writ of prohibition and/or mandate prohibiting the San Mateo County Superior Court, Juvenile Division from compelling GGRCs participation as a party in the underlying juvenile delinquency proceedings pertaining to real party Marissa D. On March 2, 2007 we requested opposition from the real party in interest and notified the parties that the court may choose to act by issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180.) Both real party and county counsel indicated that neither would be filing an opposition to the petition; accordingly, we now direct the issuance of a peremptory writ.

When Marissa D. was still a minor she was convicted of felony transportation of marijuana and granted deferred entry of judgment to her parents home under the probation offices supervision. While on probation she suffered a motorcycle accident and was ultimately diagnosed with traumatic brain injury. Since then she has exhibited inappropriate behavior.

The San Mateo County Mental Health Department referred real party to GGRC for an eligibility assessment. GGRC, a non-profit corporation, is one of 21 Regional Centers created by the Lanterman Developmental Disability Services Act, Welfare & Institutions Code sections 4500 et seq. Its goal is to provide a pattern of services and supports  to serve the developmentally disabled. GGRC determined real party did not meet the eligibility criteria necessary for it to provide her services and advised her of that on February 1, 2006. At the same time it also explained how to appeal its decision. At approximately that time, real party requested that GGRC consider a psychological report that was then being completed; GGRC agreed to do so, but ultimately it did not change its initial decision. Thus, on January 9, 2007 GGRC informed real party a second time that she did not meet its eligibility requirements and again set out the procedure for her to appeal its decision. As indicated in that January 9, letter, a copy of that letter was also sent to real partys parents.

In response to real partys request to join a social worker, Andy Sweet, M.S.W., and GGRC in the juvenile delinquency proceedings, the court issued a Notice of Hearing on Joinder.[1] By seeking to join these parties, real party was interested in obtaining the minutes and decisions of a GGRC interdisciplinary meeting which made recommendations regarding her eligibility for services. The denial letters state GGRCs conclusions that real party does not have a developmental disability and is, therefore, ineligible for services. Real party contends that the relevant regulation defines a qualifying developmental disability, inter alia, as someone who requires treatment similar to that required for mental retardation, so she should qualify. Her hope was that the minutes of the interdisciplinary meeting would support her claim that she is eligible for services. GGRC, on the other hand, counters that if real party wanted to challenge its decision to deny services, she had to have timely followed the appeal procedures outlined in its denial letters, as set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 4712 and appeal to the Department of Developmental Services for a fair hearing (which is conducted under the auspices of the Office of Administrative Hearings). Petitioner also contends that the superior court lacks jurisdiction to reverse GGRCs decision to deny services.

Without citing any legal authority, the court joined GGRC in the juvenile delinquency proceedings. The courts written order, after denying a motion to quash (which is not a subject of this petition), states: GGRC has been joined. If GGRC provides info to counsel prior that date [the March 8, 2007 date to which the matter was continued] they dont need to appear. All documents re: minor to be provided to [real partys counsel].

At the hearing the court first denied a pending motion to quash. Without any substantive discussion of the joinder, the court then indicated that GGRC was in. When GGRCs counsel attempted to have the court explain the basis for its ruling, the sole explanation given by the court was Because I said so. Although petitioner did not include in the record submitted to this court real partys papers requesting joinder, when given a chance to oppose the petition, both real party and county counsel declined the invitation to do so, thereby advancing no legal basis for the courts ruling.

Only petitioner put forward any possible legal bases for the courts ruling; petitioners analysis, not surprisingly, suggests that the courts ruling was erroneous.

First, petitioner points to Welfare & Institutions Code section 727, which allows for the joinder of government agencies in juvenile proceedings where the minor has been adjudged a ward of the court. As explained above, however, GGRC is not a government agency; furthermore, real party is not a ward of the court. Consequently, section 727 does not permit the joinder of GGRC in this situation. Petitioner also points to Welfare & Institutions Code section 362, which is applicable in specified situations where the child is a dependent child of the court and which allows government agencies or private service providers to be joined. That statute defines private service provider as an agency or individual who receives governmental funding or reimbursement for providing services directly to foster children. (Welf. & Inst. Code  362, subd. (e).) Here, real party is not a dependent child of the court and GGRC, a private nonprofit community agency, does not qualify as a private service provider because it receives no governmental funding for providing services directly to dependent children. Thus, section 362 does not provide the appropriate framework to join GGRC.

In addition, under either of these statutes, the entity to be joined must have violated a legal obligation to provide services. (Welf. & Inst. Code  362, subd. (a) [allowing joinder where court determines that the agency or private service provider has failed to meet a legal obligation to provide services to the child.]; Welf. & Inst. Code  727, subd. (a) [allowing joinder where a court determines that the governmental agency has failed to meet a legal obligation to provide services to the minor.]; Southard v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 729, 734.) Here there is no evidence that GGRC failed to meet its obligation to real party. This is as an additional reason why joinder is not appropriate.

Finally, we note the odd formulation of the courts order joining GGRC, but excusing its appearance if it provides certain information to the real party. At the hearing the court acknowledged that in this situation its powers were very limited. It indicated that in order to effect a change in GGRCs decision to deny services, real party would have to follow a civil remedy. All the court can do in this situation with a joinder is order that the paper trail be provided you so you can pursue that.As stated in the two joinder statutes discussed above, their purpose is to facilitate coordination and cooperation among the agencies/private service providers which are subject to each of the statutes; they are not intended to facilitate the discovery of an institutions internal documents by someone who has been denied services. Joining GGRC in this litigation is improper under the facts presented and clearly unauthorized.

The Palmaprocedure is appropriate when petitioners entitlement to relief is so obvious that no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue. (Ng v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see also Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1236-1237, 1240-1241.) Here, as the lack of any opposition to the petition attests, no purpose would be served by further review because petitioners right to relief is clear. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding respondent superior court to vacate its joinder of GGRC in the underlying litigation and to enter a new and different order denying real partys request to join petitioner.

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Parrilli, J.

We concur:

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McGuiness, P. J.

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Pollak, J.

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[1] Petitioners Opposition to Request for Joinder filed below also indicates that there was an attempt to join an additional social workerDominique Gallagher. The juvenile courts order, however, does not mention either social worker. Indeed, there is no indication in the exhibits supporting the petition and no allegation in the petition itself that the individual social workers were joined.