Brun v. Truckee-Tahoe Airport Dist.

Filed 4/26/07 Brun v. Truckee-Tahoe Airport Dist. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

Plaintiff Karl Brun had been employed by defendant Truckee-Tahoe Airport District (TTAD) since 1991 to perform a variety of ground services to aircraft, arriving passengers and crews. On February 16, 2000, Brun suffered an epileptic seizure while off duty, and returned to work the following month. Beginning in 2002, several incidents occurred which Brun believed violated his rights under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code,  12900 et seq.)^[1]as a person with a medical disability. Brun and TTAD negotiated a mutually acceptable accommodation agreement in April 2004, after Brun formally invoked FEHA. In December 2004, Brun filed a civil complaint for injunctive relief and damages against TTAD, its general manager David V. Gotschall, and supervisors Michael Scott, and Jake Mihevc after they initiated actions which ultimately resulted in his termination. Several of the disciplinary actions, including an incident in which TTAD accused Brun of leaving a Caterpillar front-end loader running in an enclosed building, Bruns termination, and the subsequent Skelly hearing,^[2]occurred after Brun filed his FEHA charge.

In addition to alleging facts in support of his request for an injunction to halt the termination process, Brun alleged workplace harassment in violation of FEHA, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, retaliation in asserting the protection of FEHA, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy (against TTAD alone). Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment and Brun appeals.

Brun challenges only the trial courts entry of summary judgment and dismissal of the second cause of action for harassment, the fourth cause of action for retaliation, and the fifth cause of action for wrongful termination. As to the causes of action for harassment and retaliation, Brun argues the court erred in ruling the claims were barred on grounds he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) before filing suit in superior court. As to the cause of action for wrongful termination, Brun contends the court erred in finding TTAD was immune from tort liability under section 815, subdivision (a).^[3] Because we conclude there was no error in the courts rulings, we need not address the merits of Bruns substantive claims.

I.

Standard of Review

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A defendant has met his or her burden of showing that plaintiffs cause of action has no merit by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc.,  437c, subd. (p)(2), italics added.) Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of fact with respect to that cause of action or defense. (Ibid.) We review the trial courts ruling de novo. (Silva v. Lucky Stores (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 261 (Silva).)

The pleadings are the starting point in the summary judgment analysis. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues: the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. [Citations.] The complaint measures the materiality of the facts tendered in a defendants challenge to the plaintiffs cause of action. [Citation.] (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)

In independently reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same three-step analysis used by the superior court. We identify the issues framed by the pleadings, determine whether the moving party has negated the opponents claims, and determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citation.] (Silva, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.)

Where a complaint does not state a cognizable claim, it is not necessary to proceed to the second step, since a defendant has no obligation to present evidence to negate a legally inadequate claim. [A] defendants motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint . . . . Motions for summary judgment in such suitations [sic] have otherwise been allowed as being in legal effect motions for judgment on the pleadings. [Citations.] [Citation.] (Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995)35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662-1663, italics omitted.) Thus, if we determine that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as a matter of law, we need not reach the question whether plaintiffs opposition to the summary judgment motion raises a triable issue of fact on the underlying, substantive claims. (Ibid.)

Here the pleadings framed the issues. Defendants raised the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies in their answer to Bruns claims of harassment and retaliation. Similarly, as to Bruns claim of wrongful termination, defendants raised governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. On summary judgment, Brun failed to sustain the burden of showing there was a triable issue of fact as to either complete defense.

II.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

The first question before us is whether the allegations of harassment and retaliation in Bruns second and fourth causes of action were within the scope of the administrative complaint he filed with the DFEH. We conclude that they were not and affirm the trial courts ruling that Brun failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for harassment and retaliation under FEHA.

A. DFEH Exhaustion Requirements:

FEHA prohibits an employer from discharging an employee based on the employees physical disability, mental disability, and medical condition. ( 12940, subd. (a).) Unlawful acts also include retaliation and harassment. ( 12940, subds. (h) & (j).) Any person aggrieved by the action(s) of his or her employer must file a written charge with DFEH within one year of the alleged unlawful practice. ( 12960, subds. (b) & (d).) The charge consists of a verified complaint, in writing, that states the particulars of the alleged unlawful practice and includes the names and addresses of the persons alleged to have committed the complained of unlawful practice. ( 12960, subd. (b).) The crucial element is the factual statement included in the charge filed with DFEH. (Sandhu v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 846, 858 (Sandhu), citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970) 431 F.2d 455, 462 [addressing the exhaustion issue in the context of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e et seq.].)

If the DFEH investigates and finds the charge is valid, it attempts to eliminate the unlawful practice complained of by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. ( 12963.7, subd. (a).) If conciliation fails, the DFEH may file an accusation which is heard by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission, an agency empowered to grant relief. ( 12903, 12965-12970.) If the DFEH does not issue an accusation within 150 days of receiving a charge or earlier decides that no accusation will issue, it must provide the complainant employee with notice of his or her right to sue. ( 12965, subd. (b).)

An employee must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by FEHA by filing a complaint with the DFEH and obtaining the notice of right to sue before filing a civil action for damages in superior court based on violations of the FEHA. ( 12960, 12965, subd. (b); Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 492.) In the context of FEHA, the failure to exhaust the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional, not a procedural defect. . . . [Citation.] (Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Company (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (Okoli).) It may be raised to challenge plaintiffs cause of action at any stage of a civil proceeding. (See, e.g., Okoli, supra, 1607 [on appeal following trial]; Sandhu, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 846 [demurrer]; and Rodriguez v. Airborne Express (9th Cir. 2001) 265 F.3d 890 [summary judgment] (Rodriguez).)

The scope of the written administrative charge defines the permissible scope of the subsequent civil action. [Citation.] Allegations in the civil complaint that fall outside of the scope of the administrative charge are barred for failure to exhaust. (Rodriguez, supra, 265 F.3d at p. 897.) The civil complaint is barred where it adds claims that were neither like nor reasonably related to the DFEH charge and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation. (Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1617; see also Sandhu, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 859; Rodriguez, supra, at p. 897; Couveau v. American Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 218 F.3d 1078, 1082.) The result turns on a comparison of the language of the DFEH charge and the allegations of the civil complaint, as demonstrated in Okoli and Sandhu.

Charles Okoli filed a charge with DFEH alleging his supervisor denied him promotion based on his race and national origin. After obtaining his notice of right to sue, Okoli filed a civil action alleging racial and national origin discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation against Lockheed Technical Operations Company. He based the retaliation claim on numerous adverse employment actions he claimed were the result of his filing the DFEH charge. The jury returned defense verdicts on the causes of action for discrimination and harassment, but found in Okolis favor on the retaliation claim. Lockheed appealed, arguing Okoli never mentioned retaliation in his DFEH claim and thus the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear that claim under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. (Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1609, 1612.) The appellate court agreed and reversed. (Id. at p. 1612.) It concluded that the unlawful retaliation, which occurred after the filing of the DFEH charge, would not reasonably have been uncovered in an investigation of the charges that were made, i.e., why Okoli had not been promoted and whether his supervisor had made derogatory comments about his national origin. (Id. at p. 1617.) Nor was the retaliation claim like or reasonably related to Okolis DFEH claim. (Ibid.)

The court reached a different result in Sandhu. After working for Lockheed Missiles and Space Company for eight years, Dale Sandhu was terminated. He filed a charge with DFEH, checking race and age as the basis for discrimination on the form. Sandhu stated his belief that he had been discriminated against ‛because of [his] age (48) and race (Asian). (Sandhu, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) After obtaining a notice of right to sue, Sandhu filed a complaint in superior court alleging he was treated differently on account of his race and/or national origin. (Ibid.) Sandhu described himself in the complaint as ‛East Indian. (Ibid.) Lockheed demurred arguing, Sandhus failure to allege discrimination on the basis of national origin in his administrative charge was a jurisdictional prerequisite to his pursuit of a civil action. (Id. at p. 850.) The trial court agreed and Sandhu appealed. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal reversed concluding, the administrative investigation into Sandhus claim of disparate treatment because he was Asian would likely have encompassed both race and national origin. (Id. at p. 859.)

B. The Pleadings, Facts and Arguments in Superior Court:

A comparison of the allegations of Bruns civil complaint with the facts set forth in his DFEH complaint shows the complaint added causes of action for harassment and retaliation that were not like or reasonably related to the DFEH charge and were not likely to be uncovered in the DFEH investigation.

1. The DFEH Complaint:

On November 18, 2003, Brun filed a complaint against TTAD with DFEH. He checked boxes indicating the discrimination was based on DISABILITY and inserted his medical diagnosis. Brun described the details of his claim as follows:

I. From December 2002, until September 2003, I was subjected to differential treatment (issued verbal, written warnings, placed on probation and suspended). I am currently working as an Airport Worker I earning $15.46.

II. David Gotschall, General Manager, has not given me a reason for the differential treatment.

III. I believe that I was subjected to differential [treatment] because of my disability (epilepsy). My belief is based on the following:

A. From December 2002, until September 2003, David Gotschall, General Manager, subjected me to differential treatment (issued verbal, written warnings, placed on probation and suspended). I am aware of several non-disabled co-workers (names on file with DFEH) who have had performance related issues who were [not] issued verbal, written warnings, placed on probation or suspended as I was.

After several months of negotiation with the DFEH, Brun and TTAD reached an accommodation agreement. DFEH closed Bruns case based on the consultants recommendation that there was No Probable Cause To Prove A Violation Of The Statute, and issued its Notice of Right-To-Sue on November 16, 2004.

2. The Civil Complaint:

Brun filed his civil complaint in superior court a month later. The complaint listed 17 incidents that occurred before and after November 2003 that formed the basis for his causes of action for harassment and retaliation. The alleged harassment and retaliation included a November 2004 breach of the accommodation agreement by failing to notify Brun within 24 hours that TTAD was investigating the claim that he had allegedly left a Caterpillar front-end loader (the 950F) running inside a closed maintenance building and by placing him on administrative leave.

The complaint alleged: FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST TTAD, GOTSCHALL, SCOTT, AND MIHEVC, EACH INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES FOR WORKPLACE HARASSMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT. It asserted TTAD was liable for harassment as an employer under section 12940, subdivision (j)(1) and Gotschall, Scott and Mihevc liable as individuals under section 12940, subdivision (j)(3).

The complaint also alleged: FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR RETALIATION IN ASSERTING PROTECTION OF FEHA. It highlighted Bruns latent seizure/epilepsy disorder as a medical disability entitled to protection under FEHA, and continued: Plaintiffs legally-protected disability is the probable motivating factor of the adverse employment action, specifically the pending termination, taken against him by TTAD and individual defendants Gotschall, Scott and Mihevc.

Brun sought compensatory economic, non-economic and punitive damages against TTAD and the individual defendants in the second (harassment) and fourth (retaliation) causes of action.

Defendants answered the complaint and raised several affirmative defenses. Defendants alleged as an affirmative defense that the harassment and retaliation causes of action were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code  12900, et seq. Defendants also raised that defense in their motion for summary judgment. In addition, they argued Brun failed to name Scott and Mihevc, or allege any type of retaliation or harassment in his DFEH charge. Defendants cited the DFEH charge and the subsequent notice of case closure (which references issuance of the notice of right-to-sue) in support of their argument.

Brun responded that there was no lack of notice because Scott vigorously contested plaintiffs [sic] factual allegations of illegal treatment, harassment and retaliation in the course of the DFEH investigation. Brun also contended defendants should have raised the exhaustion issue by demurrer. At the hearing on defendants motion, Brun argued: [T]his is not a case where differential treatment suddenly turns into harassment, suddenly turns into retaliation, suddenly turns into some other form of misconduct by the employer requiring that he will [go] back [to] the DFEH and file two or three or four medical complaints. Thats not the law. . . . [A] party who is covered by the important public policy, the FEHA, is not required to tread through a mine field of claims and more claims and more claims. Brun offered no evidence, only argument, to dispute the language of the DFEH charge.

Citing Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, the court agreed with defendants that Bruns DFEH complaint raised only a claim of discrimination, a separate and distinct claim from either retaliation or harassment. It also found that Brun failed to name the individual defendants in his DFEH claim.

C. Discussion:

On appeal, Brun argues for the first time that harassment is just a sub-set of discrimination and retaliation is nothing more than the allegation defendants retaliated against Brun for having a disability and seeking the protection of FEHA. Regardless of the precise theory Brun argued in the trial court and the precise theory he argues here, the question remains: Were the allegations of harassment and retaliation in Bruns civil complaint like or reasonably related to the DFEH charge of discrimination and likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation. (Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1617.) It is clear they were not.

Bruns DFEH charge never mentioned harassment or retaliation. Brun alleged in his verified civil complaint that he invoked FEHA in early 2003 asking that the required interactive process be commenced to achieve a reasonable accommodation of his condition. (Italics added.) He further alleged that he worked with TTADs counsel starting [in] February of 2003 to achieve a mutually acceptable Reasonable Accommodation Agreement which was concluded on April 30, 2004 . . . . (Italics added.) Thereafter, the DFEH consultant recommended that the case be closed because there existed No Probable Cause To Prove A Violation Of The Statute. Brun cites nothing in the record to show the DFEH investigation focused on anything beyond the alleged differential treatment based on Bruns medical condition. His assertion that Scotts false statements to the agency prompted the case closure is mere speculation in the face of the language of the notice. As to the language of the DFEH charge, Brun challenges defendants evidence as an inaccurate paraphrase. However, the document speaks for itself. Given the language of the DFEH charge, the subsequent accommodation agreement, the notice of case closure, and the allegations of Bruns civil complaint, we conclude Brun never exhausted his administrative remedies with the DFEH for his subsequent claims of harassment and retaliation for invoking FEHA.

Brun also argues we should ignore his failure to mention harassment and retaliation in the 2003 DFEH charge because the form lacked boxes to check harassment and retaliation as grounds for his claim. The selection of the type of discrimination alleged, i.e. the selection of which box to check, is in reality nothing more than the attachment of a legal conclusion to the facts alleged. (Sandhu, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 858-859.) As we explained, the factual statement is the crucial element of the charge. (Id. at p. 858.) Here, the factual statement made no mention of harassment or retaliation.

We also reject Bruns claim, made for the first time on appeal, that he exhausted his administrative remedies as to the individual defendants by securing right-to-sue notices as to each defendant after he filed his civil action in superior court. We already explained that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a civil action. (Okoli, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1613.) Bruns concession that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to Scott and Mihevc before filing his complaint in superior court is fatal to his argument here. (See Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1511.) Moreover, Brun appears to have waived any claim against the individual defendants by arguing on appeal that harassment and retaliation are subsets of discrimination. Individual defendants cannot be found liable for simple discrimination as a matter of law. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 659-662.)

III.

Failure to File a Tort Claim

The next question is whether Bruns admitted failure to file a tort claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy barred his civil action for damages on that cause of action. We conclude that it did.

A. Tort Claim Requirements:

The California Tort Claims Act ( 810 et seq.) generally exempts public entities from common law tort liability. ( 815, subd. (a); Elson v. Public Utilities Commission (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 577, 582.) Local entities such as TTAD are public entities for purposes of its provisions. ( 811.2 & 940.4.)^[4]

Except as provided by the Tort Claims Act, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . . ( 945.4.) Causes of action for damages arising from common law, employment-related torts are actions for which a tort claim is required. (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1078-1079; see, e.g., Stockett v. Assn. of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 444 [wrongful termination in violation of public policy]; and Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1300 [constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy].) Section 910 requires presentation of a written claim which states the date, place, and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. ( 910, subd. (c).) The purpose of the claims presentation requirement is to facilitate early investigation of disputes and settlement without trial if appropriate, as well as to enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future. [Citations.] (Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 298, 303.)

B. The Pleadings, Facts and Arguments in Superior Court:

Bruns complaint alleged a fifth cause of action against TTAD for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. He cited federal and state policies that protect property rights and employees with qualifying disabilities, and specifically alleged: (1) [t]he pending discharge of plaintiff from his employment is in violation of those substantial and fundamental policies; and (2) [t]he harassment, intimidation, unlawful actions and pending termination of plaintiff are in violation of those policies. He again sought compensatory economic, non-economic and punitive damages. Defendants pled governmental immunity as an affirmative defense in their answer, stating: Defendants allege that they are immune from liability by virtue of the provisions of Title I, Division 3.6 of the Government Code of the State of California.^[5] They argued in their motion for summary judgment that section 815, subdivision (a) barred Bruns cause of action for wrongful termination. In response, Brun acknowledged it was undisputed he did not file a tort claim based on allegations of common law wrongful termination. Apart from claiming internal exhaustion was not required, Brun did not respond to the defense of immunity in his points and authorities in opposition to defendants motion for summary judgment.

The court ruled that Bruns cause of action for common law wrongful termination in violation of public policy was barred on grounds of: (1) governmental immunity under section 815, subdivision (a); and (2) Bruns failure to file a government claim before filing his lawsuit.

C. Discussion:

For the first time on appeal, Brun argues: (1) he was not required to file a tort claim because TTADs liability was premised on a mandatory duty to comply with FEHA; (2) no tort claim was required because he served a FEHA charge on TTAD; and (3) he substantially complied with the tort claim requirement by filing a complaint with DFEH. Alternatively, Brun argues the failure to file a tort claim does not bar his claim for equitable relief. Because Bruns argument raises only issues of law, we will address -- and reject -- each in turn.

Section 815.6 provides that [w]here a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty. An enactment creates a mandatory duty if it requires a public agency to take a particular action. [Citation.] An enactment does not create a mandatory duty if it merely recites legislative goals and policies that must be implemented through a public agencys exercise of discretion. [Citation.] (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 627, 639.) The use of the word shall in a legislative enactment does not necessarily create a mandatory duty. (Ibid.)

Brun cites Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, and Prilliman v. United Airlines, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 935 because they both describe FEHA obligations as questions of mandatory duty imposed on employers. However, Trujillo merely recites general legislative goals and policies under which a public entity employer exercises significant discretion. (63 Cal.App.4th at p. 286.) Prilliman is inapposite because United Airlines is a private employer. Brun cites no case that holds FEHA imposes a mandatory duty on a public entity employer such as TTAD to take a particular action in complying with the requirements of FEHA. We therefore conclude section 815.6 does not excuse Brun from complying with the Tort Claims Act.

We also reject Bruns argument that his FEHA charge satisfied the tort claim requirement. This case is different from Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701 (Garcia), and Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861 (Snipes), two cases cited by Brun. Sharon Garcia filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination based on sex, national origin and retaliation for filing an earlier EEOC complaint. She obtained a right to sue letter and filed an action in superior court alleging harassment and discrimination resulting in humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress. (Garcia, supra, at p. 706.) The court held that the claims-presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act did not apply because Garcias civil complaint, which incorporated the EEOC complaint, alleged unlawful employment practices proscribed by FEHA. (Id. at pp. 710-711.) Joseph Snipess civil action mirrored his FEHA claim. (Snipes, supra, at pp. 863-864.) The court held that actions seeking redress for employment discrimination pursuant to [FEHA] are not subject to the claim-presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act . . . . (Id. at p. 863.)

Here, Bruns complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, filed in December 2004, was based on different facts than the FEHA complaint filed in November 2003. Indeed, Brun acknowledges he did not put TTAD on notice of its potential liability for disability discrimination under the common law (in addition to FEHA). Contrary to Bruns argument, the two claims -- wrongful termination under the common law and his specific statutory claims -- did not arise from the same set of facts. TTAD had not previously received notice of claims based on the Caterpillar incident and Bruns subsequent termination. We reject Bruns claim of substantial compliance for the same reason. Accordingly, Brun was required to file a tort claim before bringing his action for wrongful termination in superior court.

Finally, we reject Bruns claim his failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act does not affect his right to obtain equitable relief in the form of reinstatement. While it is true the claim-presentation requirements do not affect the right to obtain relief other than money or damages against a public entity ( 814), Bruns complaint did not seek equitable relief other than an injunction to stop the proposed disciplinary action that resulted in his termination. Nothing in the substantive allegations of his wrongful termination cause of action suggests he was seeking reinstatement. Brun sought only compensatory economic, non-economic and punitive damages in his prayer for relief.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover the costs on appeal pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.276.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.

We concur:

DAVIS, Acting P.J.

HULL, J.

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^[1] Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

^[2] A Skelly hearing is a hearing afforded to a public employee before punitive action against him takes effect. (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 215.)

^[3] Section 815, subdivision (a) provides: Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.

^[4] Under section 811.2, Public entity includes the State, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State.

Section 940.4 provides: Local public entity includes a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State, but does not include the State.

^[5] Title I, Division 3.6 of the Government Code is titled: Claims and Actions Against Public Entities and Public Employees. It includes section 815 which, as we explained, provides for governmental immunity. (See fn. 3, infra.) It also includes the tort claims provisions. ( 900 et seq.)