Other

Deann M. (mother) appeals the juvenile court orders denying her modification petition, terminating her parental rights and establishing adoption as the permanent plan for her minor child Joseph P. [1] (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388.) [2] Mother contends the court abused its discretion in denying her modification petition, and erred in finding that terminating her parental rights would not be detrimental to Joseph.

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

Defendant Blair Christopher Hall was charged with the first degree murder of his wife of 29 years, Cristi Hall. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) After a jury deadlocked eight to four in favor of conviction and a mistrial was declared, a second jury found defendant guilty of the murder, and the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison. On this appeal, defendant essentially raises four claims of evidentiary error and further claims that the evidentiary errors were both individually and cumulatively prejudicial. We conclude that all of the challenged evidence was properly admitted, and affirm the judgment.
Defendant has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in case No. E056812. We ordered the writ petition considered with this appeal. By separate order, we summarily deny the writ petition.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Brandon Anthony Brock of robbery (count 1 – Pen. Code, § 211)[1] and found true an allegation he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). Defendant thereafter admitted suffering a prior prison sentence (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate, determinate term of imprisonment of five years four months. On appeal, defendant contends the court prejudicially erred in neglecting to give the standard jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 332, on expert witness testimony. We affirm.

In an application for restraining orders, MaKenna alleged she and Ethan used to be high school classmates and friends. MaKenna alleged their friendship came to an end in the fall of 2011, when Ethan slapped her and had her arrested on false charges of "domestic violence." MaKenna further claimed that over the next several weeks, Ethan continued to contact her and sent threatening messages via a free text messaging service; changed the passwords to her e‑mail and other Internet accounts; wrote and sent a letter to his own mother in MaKenna's name; grabbed MaKenna's telephone and threw it to the ground; threatened to flatten her friend Kyle's tires; physically abused and cyberbullied her; frightened her with a gun; and threatened to kill her. Based on these allegations, MaKenna requested orders to stop Ethan from further harassing her. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.)

These appeals arise from the armed robbery of a Trader Joe’s store. Appellant Raymond Calloway was convicted of four counts in the first trial, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the counts against his co-defendant, appellant Jason Bridges. Each was convicted as charged at the second trial.
Calloway and Bridges challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions of robbing two employees who remained secreted during the entire episode and who were unknown to them. Bridges challenges the evidence identifying him as one of the robbers and the jury’s finding that he assaulted three employees who were in a back room. Bridges argues the trial court erred by informing the second jury that Calloway had been convicted of several counts in the first trial.

April Premo Williams, representing herself, informed the trial court that she is an individual with a mental disability and asked the trial court to “remove” her pending Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) matter to the superior court and to stay the matter until Williams can appeal to the United States Supreme Court or the California Supreme Court to determine her due process rights. The trial court characterized the request as a motion and denied it, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter.
We will affirm the order.

Appointed counsel for defendant Joseph Michael Kivett asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appellant Roy Hughes White contends he is entitled to an award of additional custody credits in the amount of 687 days for time spent in two residential treatment facilities. The trial court did not award any custody credits for time spent in residential treatment facilities. The People contend that only the first 14 days in a treatment facility were sufficiently restrictive to constitute custody and that White should be awarded an additional 14 days of custody credits.
We agree with the People that the balance of the residential treatment program, where White was permitted freedom to leave, was not so restrictive as to warrant an award of custody credits. Therefore, we will modify the judgment to award an additional 14 days of custody credits and in all other respects will affirm the judgment.

Jessy Garcia (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of one count of second degree burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 459).[1] Defendant admitted the truth of an allegation under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) that he suffered a 2009 conviction for a violation of section 69, resisting an executive officer.
The trial court sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years plus a consecutive year for the prior conviction allegation, to be served in county jail. The trial court granted defendant 167 days of actual credit and 167 days of conduct credits. The court ordered victim restitution in the sum of $180.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with personal use of a firearm in the commission of the murder (Pen. Code, § 12022.53).[1] He claims in this appeal that admission of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses without adequate indicia of reliability violated his right to confrontation. We conclude that the admission of the pretrial statements of witnesses who appeared and testified at trial was not error, and affirm the judgment.

J.S. (mother) appeals from six-month review orders by the juvenile court as to her minor daughters K.S. and N.K. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e), 395.) The court continued K.S.’s placement in foster care and ordered further reunification services to mother, including conjoint counseling for mother and K.S. As to N.K., who was placed with her father B.K. at disposition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), the court granted sole legal and physical custody to B.K. and terminated jurisdiction.
On this appeal, mother contends only that the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated due process by refusing to admit audiotapes made by mother and offered by her as impeachment evidence. According to mother, the court’s error was prejudicial because this evidence, if admitted, could have “painted a very different” (more favorable) picture of the relationship between her and the minors; therefore, she requests remand of both minors’ cases for rehearing.
Respondent Yolo County Department of Employment and Social Services (the Department) replies that the audiotapes were properly excluded because (1) the communications recorded were confidential and the other parties did not consent to being recorded (Pen. Code, § 632); (2) the audiotapes might have been incomplete or selectively edited; (3) they were minimally probative and would have consumed undue time (Evid. Code, § 352); and (4) mother never provided the parties with copies or transcripts of the audiotapes (Evid. Code, § 250; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1040(b)).[1]
We conclude the Department’s last point is sufficient to uphold the juvenile court’s rulings. Therefore, we shall affirm on that basis without reaching the parties’ other arguments.

Appellant Huan Ta was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and battery with serious injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)). He admitted several enhancements for prior convictions and commitments to state prison. He was sentenced to the upper term of four years on the aggravated assault, a term that was doubled because of his two prior strike convictions. The same sentence computation was applied to his battery with serious injury term, that sentence ordered to run concurrently. Additionally, the court imposed one-year enhancements for appellant’s two prior state prison commitments and an additional 16 months for one of the two unrelated driving under the influence charges (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a), punishments increased under the Three Strikes Law) he pled guilty to, and stayed the same sentence on the second. Appellant’s total term came to 11 years and 4 months. The court awarded 519 days of actual custody credits and 77 days of conduct credits for a total award of 596 days against his sentence.
Ta complains of two instances of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument and a miscomputation of his presentence custody credits. He is right about the credits, and we order 258 days added to the 519 originally computed. But the first putative misconduct assignment fails on its merits and the second was cured by an admonition by the trial court, so we affirm his conviction.

On November 17, 2011, at the conclusion of a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court concluded that minor Gianna D. came within subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (hereafter, subdivision (b)), and declared her a dependent child. Gianna’s parents, Antonio D. and Kristine K., appeal from the dispositional order. Although expressed in differing language in their separate briefs, both parents argue that the conditions which might have warranted the initial assertion of jurisdiction had, by the time of the hearing, been so alleviated, mitigated, and superseded by subsequent events that they were wholly inadequate basis for a dependency. Although the parents’ contention has some colorable merit, it is not sufficient to overturn the dependency.

Kenmore Villas, LLC (Kenmore), and its guarantors Amco Company, Inc., Suk Myong Kim, and Kyong Hwa Pak (collectively Guarantors) appeal from a judgment and orders entered in favor of California Business Bank (Bank). Kenmore and Guarantors contend that the trial court erred in sustaining Bank’s demurrer to Kenmore and Guarantors’ second amended cross-complaint without leave to amend for, among other things, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; granting Bank’s motion for summary judgment on Kenmore and Guarantors’ third amended cross-complaint for breach of contract; and granting Bank’s motion for summary adjudication as to Bank’s complaint for breach of guaranty and a common count.