Other

The juvenile court declared Cameron D. a ward of the court after he admitted committing a misdemeanor assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 17, subd. (b)(4), 245, subd. (a)(1)). Consistent with the plea agreement leading to the admission, the juvenile court dismissed two other felony charges, in which Erick Becker was the victim. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the juvenile court ordered Cameron to pay Becker restitution of $4,106, consisting of $2,393.04 for lost wages, $412.96 for Becker's share of an ambulance bill, and $1,300 for the portion of the ambulance bill paid by his insurance company.[1]

Defendant, Reginald Conwright, is serving nine years in prison after a jury found him guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459),[1] receiving stolen property (§ 496) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)) and the court found true several prior conviction allegations, including that he had been convicted of an attempted burglary that qualified as both a serious felony and a strike. Defendant argues in this appeal that he is entitled to additional presentence custody credits under the version of section 4019 that became effective October 1, 2011. As discussed below, defendant’s contention on this point has no merit. However, we do order the abstract of judgment corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement in two other respects.

Destiny Pedersen allegedly fell on toys strewn on the floor of a Target store. After hearing the evidence, a jury rendered a verdict for Target. On appeal, Pedersen contends that her case was prejudiced by the hearsay statement of an unidentified eyewitness, who said that her misbehaving child caused plaintiff’s fall. We conclude (1) plaintiff invited the error by presenting the eyewitness statement during her case-in-chief, and later failed to object to the admission of the statement, and (2) even if the issue was preserved for appeal and assuming that the eyewitness statement was inadmissible hearsay, there was no miscarriage of justice sufficient to justify a reversal of the judgment.

A jury convicted Rey Benavidez of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years or younger, T.C., digital penetration with a child 10 years or younger, T.C., attempted lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age, A.L., and misdemeanor indecent exposure after unlawful entry. Benavidez appealed and in our prior nonpublished opinion
(People v. Benavidez (June 28, 2011, G043412)), we reversed his conviction for committing an attempted lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age and concluded the trial court failed to make the requisite findings for imposition of the sex offender fine. We remanded the matter. On remand, the trial court concluded Benavidez did not have the ability to pay the sex offender fine and struck the sentence on count 4. The court, however, refused to award him additional actual credits from the time of his first sentencing hearing to the date the court struck the sentence on count 4. As we explain below, we conclude Benavidez was entitled to additional actual credits.

Rogelio Elopre appeals from the judgment entered after he was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct on a child under 14, one by force and one without force. We reject his contentions that the trial court: on its own motion should have instructed the jury with certain lesser included offenses, and should have given an instruction clarifying that breasts are not sexual organs; erred by not suppressing his statement to police investigators; and erred by not allowing both cross-examination and argument concerning whether the victim’s hymen was still intact. Because the trial court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits, we modify the judgment to reflect the correct amount and affirm the modified judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Kathleen Sommer brought a legal malpractice action against defendant Georgine F. Brave and her firm, Brave, Weber & Mack, APC (together, Brave). This appeal arises from a defense summary judgment granted on the ground that the action was barred by the limitations period established by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a)(1) (one-year statute of limitations, tolled until actual injury sustained; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; undesignated statutory references will be to this code).

Appellant Jonathan Wood was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of driving a vehicle while being under the influence of an alcoholic beverage in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) and one count of driving a vehicle with .08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced appellant to three years in state prison.

Ernest Christopher Moore appeals from his convictions by jury verdict of first degree residential burglary, attempted first degree residential burglary, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense, criminal threats, attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. He contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes and in instructing the jury on first degree burglary. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the assault conviction. He argues the prosecutor violated discovery rules and due process by failing to disclose forensic test results. Appellant argues that multiple punishment for burglary, criminal threats, and attempted robbery is improper and that the case must be remanded to afford the court an opportunity to exercise its discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. He asserts that these cumulative errors warrant reversal.
We conclude that evidence of uncharged crimes was properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The instructions on burglary were adequate. We find sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for assault with intent to commit a sex crime. The curative instruction given by the trial court was an adequate sanction for the prosecution's violation of its statutory obligation to provide timely discovery. The sentences for attempted robbery and criminal threats are stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654 (all statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated). Appellant forfeited his challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences by failing to object, but in any event the court provided an adequate reason for its sentencing choice. The trial court erred by failing to impose the mandatory five-year enhancement for each new serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a) and we order the abstract of judgment amended to reflect those enhancements.
Respondent asks us to review the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of uncharged crimes under Evidence Code section 1108. The issue was not preserved for appeal because the prosecutor opted not to pursue admissibility under that statute.

Following a joint trial, separate juries convicted defendants Richard Antonio Hundley and Curtis Level Chapman of the first degree murder of David Barreda (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and found that the murder was committed while defendants were engaged in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). Chapman's jury also found he used a firearm to commit the murder. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Defendants were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for Barreda's murder, and Chapman was sentenced to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement. Among other things, the trial court ordered each defendant to pay a $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). It refused to award either defendant presentence custody credit for the time they spent in actual custody prior to being sentenced. Defendants appeal.[2]

We granted review in this case to decide whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits law enforcement officers, approximately 90 minutes after lawfully arresting a suspect and transporting him to a detention facility, to conduct a warrantless search of the text message folder of a cell phone they take from his person after the arrest. We hold that, under the United States Supreme Court's binding precedent, such a search is valid as being incident to a lawful custodial arrest. We affirm the Court of Appeal's judgment.

This case involves one of the most egregious types of juror misconduct. During deliberations, a juror performed an experiment at his home under conditions not subject to judicial oversight or cross-examination. He later reported the result, which was unfavorable to defendant, to his fellow jurors, who were struggling over a crucial issue in the case. The jury subsequently convicted defendant Kyle Jordan Vigil of shooting at an occupied dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246),[1] with a true finding that the crime was committed to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) (hereafter § 186.22(b)(1)), an enhancement that earned him an indeterminate life sentence (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)).
Vigil was the driver of the car that was used to commit the charged crimes. The shooter, codefendant Joshua Lawrence Latham, was convicted by the same jury of the same offense and enhancement, as well as an additional count of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3) for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)).
Both defendants appeal. With respect to Vigil, we shall reverse the judgment for prejudicial jury misconduct. With respect to Latham, we find no reversible error and shall affirm.

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), on the eve of a hearing to terminate parental rights to the minor (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) and determine whether the child's foster parents should be designated prospective adoptive parents (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (n)), the child's mother filed a relinquishment of her parental rights, designating the child's maternal aunt as the person with whom she intended the child to be placed for adoption (Fam. Code § 8700, subd. (f)). Despite having been granted numerous opportunities to visit with the child, the aunt had failed to form a bond with the child, who was quite attached to the foster parents with whom he had spent much of his life. Nonetheless, the aunt, the mother, and the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) sought the immediate placement of the child with the aunt, a position which brought them in conflict with the foster parents and the minor. At the hearing, the dependency court apparently believed that its hands were tied by the mother's designated relinquishment. Upon receipt of the official acknowledgement of mother's relinquishment, the court immediately terminated the hearing, and lifted its previous order which had prevented DCFS from removing the child from the foster parents' home without court approval.
In these consolidated appeals, we review three earlier orders of the dependency court, as well as its order lifting its â€

Appellant Jose A. Villegas-Torres appeals from a judgment and sentence entered on his plea of guilty to the felony charge of digital penetration of an unconscious person. His court-appointed attorney has filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to conduct an independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. As our review discloses no arguable issue, Court shall affirm the judgment and sentence.

Probate Code Sec. 1516.5 which authorizes termination of parental rights when a probate guardianship has continued for at least two years, and trial court finds that adoption by guardian would be in child's best interest is not facially unconstitutional by adopting the best interests of a child as standard for terminating parental rights. Court of appeal erred in barring termination of father's parental rights without a finding of unfitness if father could demonstrate a commitment to parental responsibility where father was qualified to assert his rights as a presumed father but expressly waived those rights when child was placed in guardianship.