PEOPLE v. CARLIN Part II
Sixth Amendment does not require that predicate offenses under Sexually Violent Predators Act be limited to those that have been admitted by defendant to involve substantial sexual conduct or which were found by jury to involve such conduct at the time. Trier of fact in proceeding under act may find that the past offense involved substantial sexual conduct. Trial court did not violate defendant's right to due process by precluding him from calling victim of past crime as a witness where defendant proffered that such testimony would show the offense did not involve substantial sexual conduct, contrary to victim's prior statements, but there was no showing that victim had made recent suggestion that his prior statements were inaccurate. Reliance on victim's post plea hearsay statements to prove that prior conviction was for an offense involving substantial sexual conduct violated right to due process where trial court precluded defendant from calling victim as a witness, prosecution made no showing that witness was unavailable, prosecution did not call victim as its witness, and neither party introduced victim's testimony from previous trial, which resulted in a hung jury prior to defendant's plea. Federal constitutional error in SVPA proceeding requires reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Erroneous reliance upon inadmissible hearsay to prove one of three alleged predicate convictions was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it is unknown which of the alleged predicate convictions jury found to be proven, and jury might not have found defendant to be a SVP if hearsay statements had not been admitted. Judge is not required to instruct jury in SVPA proceeding that they must unanimously agree on which prior convictions involved substantial sexual conduct or that must unanimously agree on which acts constituted substantial sexual conduct.
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