HUTTON v. HAFIF Part II
Where plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim was based on a defamation action by her former attorney that had been dismissed pursuant to anti SLAPP statute, her lawsuit was within statutory definition of a Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 425.18 (b)(1) SLAPPback action, and defendant thus was not entitled to attorney's fees after prevailing on special motion to strike her claim. Where attorney's defamation action had included allegations that plaintiff had complained about him to State Bar but was not solely based on that communication, action was not illegal as a matter of law within meaning of Sec. 425.18(h) because it violated Business and Professions Code Sec. 6094(a) which forbids lawsuits predicated on communications to the State Bar and thus did not preclude attorney from moving to strike plaintiff's subsequent SLAPPback action. Notwithstanding 2005 amendment to Sec. 425.16(b)(3) providing that a determination that a plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing on his or her claim may not be used in any subsequent action or proceeding, court's denial of summary judgment against attorney's defamation action established probable cause to file that lawsuit, and trial judge properly granted attorney's special motion to strike subsequent malicious prosecution complaint.
Comments on HUTTON v. HAFIF Part II