P. v. Monroy
An order denying a motion to vacate a judgment is an order after judgment, and might be considered appealable under P. C. 1237(b). But when an appealable judgment of conviction is entered, the defendant has an adequate remedy by an appeal from it. If it were permissible for the defendant to move to vacate the judgment, and then appeal from an order denying the motion, the effect would be to give either of two entirely unwarranted privileges: (a) The defendant could appeal from the judgment and also from the order denying the motion to vacate, thus obtaining two appeals from virtually the same ruling. (b) The defendant could neglect to appeal from the judgment, and at any later time make the motion to vacate and appeal from the order of denial, thus indefinitely extending the time for appeal.
For these reasons the order is ordinarily nonappealable, regardless of whether there was an appeal from the judgment, or whether the errors asserted are the same as those that were raised on an appeal from the judgment, or were such as could have been raised on such an appeal but were not. . . . (6 Witkin, supra, at 53.)
This court concludes that the Order is not appealable. Any other result would allow a defendant to file successive motions to modify or vacate a conviction and, upon their denials, perfect multiple appeals in essence challenging a judgment long since final. (Cf. 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Writs, 99.) This appeal is not taken timely from the judgment in 2001. Therefore, the appeal in the above entitled action is dismissed.
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