P. v. Manuel
The facts in this case are crucial, because ultimately, the appeal comes down to whether, if defense counsel had objected to certain out-of-court statements, defendant would still have been convicted of murder.
Victim Roy Serafin was shot and killed in the street in front of his house in Barstow. According to his family, his friends, and the physical evidence, he had just backed his pickup truck out of his driveway to go to his parents house; he was shot while near, and probably still inside, the pickup.
One Ellis Cooper claimed to be an eyewitness to the shooting. He told the police that defendant was the shooter. Cooper, however, did not testify at trial and was never subject to cross-examination. His hearsay statements came into evidence (repeatedly) only because defendants trial counsel failed to object to them indeed, he elicited most of them himself.
In light of Coopers statements, the police arrested defendant. At first, defendant denied any involvement in the shooting. After he had been in custody for about four months, however, he told the police that he and his friend Jolin Reynolds had been trying to collect a drug debt from a Mexican dude. Defendant had agreed to thump him up, but defendant and another friend, Michael Halsey were still in their car when Reynolds got out and shot the dude instead. Defendant insisted that Cooper was not there.
The police then arrested Halsey. Halsey admitted driving defendant and Reynolds to the victims house. However, he claimed that he and Reynolds were still in the car when defendant walked up to the victims front door and shot the victim there. Halsey denied even knowing Cooper.
Defendant, Halsey, and Reynolds were charged jointly with one count of murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a).) Reynoldss trial was later severed. Halsey entered into a plea bargain. As a result, he was the key witness against defendant at trial. Halsey testified that he drove defendant, Reynolds, and Cooper to Howze Liquor to buy some beer. While they were there, defendant spotted the victim. At defendants direction, they followed the victim home. Defendant got into a fistfight with the victim and, when he found himself on the losing end, shot him. Thus, Halseys trial testimony differed in several respects from his earlier statements to the police. Moreover, it conflicted with other evidence; among other things, the victim had not had enough time to go to and from Howze Liquor. Nevertheless, the prosecution argued that Halseys trial testimony was entirely truthful and that it was corroborated by Coopers hearsay statements.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a), 189.) It also found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing death. (Pen. Code, 12022.53, subd. (d).) Accordingly, defendant was sentenced to a total of 50 years to life in prison. In this appeal, defendant contends:
1. The trial court erred by failing to exclude Coopers statements identifying defendant as the shooter, both as inadmissible hearsay under state law and under the federal confrontation clause as construed in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] (Crawford).
2. The trial court similarly erred by failing to exclude evidence that one Annette Rasch told the police that defendant was at the crime scene.
3. The prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing evidence of the victims gang affiliation, as well as other evidence that the crime was gang related.
4. The trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence that defendants nickname was C Murder.
In each instance, defendant alternatively contends that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the challenged evidence.
Court hold that defendants trial counsel waived the contention that Coopers statements were inadmissible by failing to object to them. Defense counsels failure to object on Crawford grounds was not deficient performance, because Crawford was not decided until after this case was tried. His failure to object on hearsay grounds, however, was objectively deficient performance. Moreover, (1) because there was little evidence of defendants guilt aside from Halseys testimony, (2) because Halseys credibility was questionable, and (3) because the prosecutor relied on Coopers statements to corroborate Halsey, Court conclude that the deficient performance was prejudicial.
Because defendants other contentions appear unlikely to arise again on remand or, at least, unlikely to arise in the same procedural posture Court do not address them.
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