P. v. Cepeda
In a jury trial, Steven Trigger Gallegos (Gallegos) was convicted of kidnapping for robbery (Pen. Code, 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1); kidnapping during carjacking ( 209.5, subd. (a); count 2); two counts of second degree robbery ( 211; counts 3 & 6); carjacking ( 215, subd. (a); count 4); and attempted murder ( 667/187, subd. (a); count 5). With respect to counts 1 through 5, the jury found that Gallegos had personally inflicted great bodily injury and had used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife. ( 12022.7, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) In the same jury trial, Gallegos and Charles Casper Cepeda (Cepeda) were each convicted of two counts of first degree murder ( 187, subd. (a); counts 7 & 8), and simple kidnapping ( 207, subd. (a); count 9). For the murder of Carmen Cepeda in count 7, the jury found special circumstances of financial gain and that the perpetrators had committed more than one offense of murder. ( 190.2, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(3).) For the murder of Steven Kimzey in count 8, the jury found special circumstances that the victim was a witness who was killed to prevent his testimony and that the perpetrators had committed more than one offense of murder. ( 190.2, subds. (a)(3) & (a)(10).) With respect to the murder and the simple kidnapping convictions, the jury found that Gallegos had personally discharged a firearm proximately causing death ( 12022.53, subd. (d)), and as to Cepeda, that a principal was armed with a firearm ( 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In a court trial, the trial court made findings that Gallegos had a prior conviction that qualified him for sentencing pursuant to the Three Strikes law and that he had served a separate prison term. ( 667, subds. (b)(i), 1170.12, 667.5, subd. (b).) For Gallegos, at sentencing, the trial court imposed a determinate term of 22 years (a doubled determinate term of 11 years), plus two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole enhanced by terms of 25 years to life for the use of a firearm proximately causing death, plus a consecutive term of 14 years to life (a doubled life term).
For Cepeda, the trial court imposed two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole, with a one year term applied to each term for the two enhancements of a principal armed with a firearm. On appeal from the judgments, the defendants raise the following claims: (1) Cepeda contends that the trial court committed Marsden error when it failed to grant Cepedas several motions for the substitution of counsel (People v.Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)); (2) Cepeda and Gallegos make different contentions as to the trial courts failure to sever counts 1 through 6 (the Jimenez and Manukyan crimes) from counts 7 through 12 (the murders); (3) Cepeda contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; (4) Cepeda contends that he was denied due process as the trial court failed to inquire into his mental competency, and trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective as he failed to investigate Cepedas mental competency; (5) Gallegos contends that he was denied due process and a fair trial by the admission of certain portions of the reporters transcript of E.A.s plea bargain; (6) Gallegos contends that the use of gang evidence denied him due process and a fair trial; and (8) Gallegos contends that the cumulative effect of the errors requires a reversal. Court find no merit in the contentions and affirm the judgments.
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