PEOPLE v. KOONTZ
In People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), our Supreme Court held that a sentencing court's failure to exercise discretion pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 is an abuse of discretion because it mistakenly believes it lacks authority to exercise such discretion. (Id., at p. 530, fn. 13.) [1] This is a similar case. We hold that section 1385 vests trial courts with the discretion to strike a prior serious felony conviction in order to afford the maximum allowable presentence conduct credits. We remand to the trial court to determine whether a defendant should be awarded such credits (§ 4019, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1)).
In exchange for an indicated three-year sentence, Trevor Lee Koontz pled guilty to felony child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)), and admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)) and two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck the prior serious felony conviction and a prior prison term. On March 16, 2010, it sentenced appellant to three years state prison. The court awarded 219 days actual credit and 108 days conduct credit (§ 4019, subds. (b)(2) & (c)(2)) but ruled that appellant was not eligible to receive one-for-one conduct credits (an additional 108 days conduct credit) due to the prior serious felony strike conviction.
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