P. v. Cefalu
Salvatore John Cefalu appeals from an order committing him for an indeterminate term to the custody of the Department of Mental Health (DMH) after a court trial wherein he was found to be a “sexually violent predator†(SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.).[1] He claims the denial of his motion to dismiss the petition was reversible error requiring his immediate release, because both the 2007 and 2009 protocols used by the evaluators were invalid. He relies on In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509 (Ronje) to challenge the evaluators’ use of the 2007 protocol as an “underground†regulation. He also asserts that the 2009 protocol is invalid because it is not a “standardized assessment protocol†within the meaning of section 6601, subdivision (c). Defendant contends that the use of those protocols violated his statutory and constitutional rights, and deprived the trial court of fundamental jurisdiction. For reasons explained below, we find both of defendant’s challenges to the 2007 and 2009 protocols lack merit.
Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of the SVPA on equal protection, due process, ex post facto, and double jeopardy grounds. We conclude that those claims are foreclosed by People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172 (McKee I). Further, based on the reasoning of People v. McKee (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1325 (McKee II) (review den. Oct. 10, 2012, S204503), we find no constitutional infirmity in the SVPA’s provisions for indeterminate commitments. We will therefore affirm the trial court’s commitment order.
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