P. v. Crawford
In an information filed by the Los Angeles District Attorney, defendant and appellant Johnnie Bernard Crawford was charged with second degree commercial burglary (count I; Pen. Code, § 459),[1] and vandalism over $400 (count II; § 594, subd. (a)). As to both counts, it was alleged that appellant’s sentence could be enhanced pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b). Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations.
Trial was by jury. The jury found appellant guilty on both counts as charged. He admitted five prior conviction allegations.
Probation was denied. Appellant was sentenced to state prison for five years. He received presentence custody credit for 424 days of actual custody, plus 424 days of conduct credit, for a total credit of 848 days. The trial court ordered him to pay a $800 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), $80 in court security fees pursuant to section 1465.8, and $60 in criminal conviction assessments pursuant to Government Code section 70373. The trial court awarded $1,752.95 in direct restitution to the victim. It imposed and stayed a $800 parole revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, appellant argues: (1) Insufficient evidence supports appellant’s conviction because (a) the courtyard does not constitute a building for purposes of the burglary statute (§ 459), and (b) even if the courtyard is a building, there was insufficient evidence of entry for purposes of burglary; (2) The trial court abused its discretion and denied appellant his right to due process and a fair trial by admitting, under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), testimony regarding two prior burglaries to prove intent; and (3) The trial court erred in failing to stay the sentence on appellant’s vandalism conviction when he had been sentenced for commercial burglary.
We agree with the parties that appellant’s punishment on count II (vandalism) should have been stayed pursuant to section 654 because it was part of the same course of conduct and had the same objective as the burglary in count I. Therefore, we correct the sentence. Upon remand, we direct the trial court to modify the abstract of judgment to stay the sentence as to count II. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
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