Raymond C. v. Super. Ct.
Petitioners Raymond C., Carol C., and Andrea C. (collectively, Petitioners), who are coconservators for real party in interest John C.,[1] seek writ relief to prevent the trial court from conducting an evidentiary hearing on a habeas corpus petition the Orange County Public Defender (Public Defender) filed on John’s behalf to obtain his release from Fairview Developmental Center (Fairview). John is a 57-year-old, developmentally disabled adult who has resided at Fairview for more than 47 years due to a series of placements made under the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (Lanterman Act; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.).[2] The Public Defender brought the habeas corpus petition under section 4800 because it contends less restrictive facilities can provide similar care for John and the Lanterman Act mandates placement of developmentally disabled persons in the least restrictive environment capable of meeting their needs. Petitioners contend the Public Defender lacks authority to pursue the habeas corpus petition because they, as John’s legal representatives, believe Fairview is the best placement for John.
We agree the Public Defender lacks authority to pursue the habeas corpus petition on John’s behalf. Supreme Court precedent establishes that the Public Defender may not pursue a section 4800 habeas corpus petition on a developmentally disabled person’s behalf without establishing “‘very exceptional circumstances’†(In re Hop (1981) 29 Cal.3d 82, 86-87 (Hop), original italics) and that other available remedies for challenging the placement are inadequate (In re Gandolfo (1984) 36 Cal.3d 889, 897-900 (Gandolfo)). We conclude very exceptional circumstances are not present in this case and the existing remedies are adequate because John’s Fairview placement has been subject to periodic judicial review for nearly 20 years, a hearing on the next periodic review already was scheduled when the Public Defender filed the habeas corpus petition, and the Public Defender failed to show Petitioners are not acting in John’s best interest.
Although we agree with Petitioners the Public Defender may not pursue its habeas corpus petition, we do not agree with their contention the Lanterman Act’s administrative fair hearing procedures deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to periodically review John’s placement. The fair hearing procedures provide the exclusive means for challenging a specific decision to change John’s placement or the other services he receives, but those procedures do not prevent the trial court from periodically reviewing whether his developmental center placement is still warranted. In Hop, the Supreme Court held that a developmentally disabled person could not be placed in a developmental center under the Lanterman Act without a judicial hearing on whether the person’s disabilities warrant placement in the most restrictive environment available. Because placement in a developmental center constitutes a significant restraint on the developmentally disabled person’s fundamental liberty interests, the Hop court concluded the person’s due process and equal protection rights require a judicial determination regarding the suitability of the placement. As explained below, we conclude Hop’s rationale also requires periodic independent reviews to ensure the developmentally disabled person’s disability continues to warrant placement in a developmental center.
Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to (1) enter an order dismissing the habeas corpus petition the Public Defender filed on John’s behalf, and (2) proceed with the Hop review hearing on John’s Fairview placement.
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