P. v. Kamakani
In July 2011, defendant Francisco Kamakani, pursuant to a negotiated disposition, pleaded guilty to attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664).[1] He also admitted allegations of premeditation (§ 189); that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)); and that he was 16 years of age or older when the offense was committed within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) and that the offense was one enumerated in subdivision (b) of that statute. Defendant was promised in exchange for this plea that the seven remaining felony counts in the information (including premeditated murder and four additional counts of attempted premeditated murder) would be dismissed, and that he would receive a prison term of 15 years to life. The court--after advising defendant of the constitutional rights he was waiving and confirming that he was voluntarily waiving those rights in pleading guilty under the agreement--advised defendant that he would be on parole for a period of three years after his release from prison. At the sentencing hearing two and one-half months later, defendant, although represented by counsel, personally requested leave to withdraw his guilty plea; he claimed, inter alia, that he had been pressured by his family into agreeing to the plea bargain. The court denied the request. It then sentenced him to prison for 15 years to life on the one attempted premeditated murder conviction. It indicated that defendant, upon his release, would be on parole for a term of seven years to life.
Defendant asserts two claims of error on appeal. First, he argues that a three-year parole period was promised to him when he entered his guilty plea, but the court could not legally impose it and was required to impose a more lengthy parole term. Therefore (he contends), the court was required to give him a chance to withdraw his plea before the imposition of this more severe sentence. And, defendant argues, to the extent that he may have forfeited this challenge because it was not raised below, he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Second, defendant argues that the court erred in imposing a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee (booking fee), pursuant to Government Code section 29550.1, without first determining that he had the ability to pay the fee. He asserts that this statute should be read as impliedly requiring an ability-to-pay determination, or, alternatively, the absence of such a requirement constituted a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection under the law.
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