P. v. Pierson
The People charged appellants Lisa Marie Pierson and Raymond Lavern Springs, Jr., with robbery (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 211);[1]assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2) (§ 245, subd. (a)(l)); vehicle theft (count 3) (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); and false imprisonment by violence (count 4; §§ 236, 237, subd. (a)). Additionally, the People charged Springs with rape of an unconscious person (count 5) (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)) and forcible rape (count 6) (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)).
A jury found Pierson guilty of the lesser included offense of grand theft on count 1, not guilty on count 2, and guilty as charged on count 3. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to count 4 and as to the lesser included offense of simple assault on count 2. The trial court declared a mistrial as to those counts, and dismissed the counts in the interest of justice. The same jury found Springs guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Pierson to two years in the custody of the sheriff and sentenced Springs to an aggregate term of 14 years four months in state prison.
Appellants claim that the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of their sentences on count 3 for auto theft pursuant to section 654, in light of the trial court's imposition of sentences on count 1 for robbery (Springs) and grand theft (Pierson). Appellants contend that the theft of the victim's car keys formed the basis of their convictions on count 1 and that this conduct was incidental to the criminal objective of stealing the victim's car, which formed the basis of their convictions on count 3. Springs also contends that the trial court erred in relying on the same aggravating factors in imposing sentences on various counts, and that the trial court erred in relying on a stayed count (count 5) in imposing an upper term full strength consecutive sentence on count 6.[2]
We conclude that section 654 did not require the trial court to stay appellants' sentences on count 3, that Springs forfeited his claim that the trial court improperly relied on the same aggravating factors in sentencing him on several different counts, and that any error that the court committed in relying on a stayed count in sentencing Springs on count 6 was harmless. We therefore affirm the judgments.
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